Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" <[email protected]> a écrit : >> > >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit : >> > > >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial input, by hypothesis >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the inputs came from >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't tell as it receives >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but *exactly* the same. So >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none are. >> > >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer moments no >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed, whatever). >> > >> > Cheers >> >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false... > > > How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two different instances of the physical process producing the same conscious thoughts.
If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness. So if ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the cpnsciuous able program with the correct inputs, then you reject physical supervenience. Quentin > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
