Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> >> > >
> >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial input, by
hypothesis
> >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the
inputs came from
> >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't tell as
it receives
> >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but *exactly*
the same. So
> >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none are.
> >> >
> >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer moments no
> >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed,
whatever).
> >> >
> >> > Cheers
> >>
> >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false...
> >
How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from
producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two
different instances of the physical process producing the same conscious
thoughts.
If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only
one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical
supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness. So
if ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the cpnsciuous
able program with the correct inputs,
Because there is only one conscious moment
then you reject physical supervenience.
I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain
states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain wetware or
in an accurate record of these brain states on a film or in a computer
memory. It is the states (or sequence of states) that makes up the
conscious experience. If the record is exact, then replaying it
reproduces exactly the initial conscious experience (as Russell points
out), not some other experience.
How does this undermine physical supervenience? The brain wetware,
photographic film, and computer memory are all physical things that
instantiate the appropriate states and the conscious experience
supervenes on these. The architecture of the computer that simulates
consciousness does not matter as long as it accurate reproduces the
appropriate brain states.
Bruce
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