meekerdb wrote:
On 3/26/2015 7:16 PM, LizR wrote:
On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of
Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is
(probably the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system /know/ it's
counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of
the "what-if" states? To put it another way, when you have a recording
of the conscious computational states being replayed, what difference
could be made by the presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that
/would/ deal with counterfactual correctness if a different
computation was being replayed, but happen in this case not to be
used? I can't see how this could make any physical difference to the
states being replayed (unless counterfactual correctness introduces
some nonphysical magic into the system?)
I see two possible answers. First, in a quantum world there is a
superposition of all those "counterfactual" states, so they are really
present, but only observable as different relative states. Of course
this already invokes QM and physics, rather than deriving them. But
maybe it can be shown that the infinite threads of the UD serve to test
all the counterfactual states.
I don't think this is correct. QM plus MWI acting on my conscious state
here and now does not generate counterfactual states (if inputs had been
different, I would have reacted in some other way.) This is because MWI
on my state does not generate the set of all possible different inputs.
We do assume determinism at some point!
Or, secondly, although there is no physical difference in the sequence
of states in the replaying, consciousness is not physical and so could
be absent. This doesn't require that consciousness be magic. If it is
the abstract thing called "computation" then in the abstract it needs to
counterfactually correct to count as computation.
I don't think even this follows. A computation is a computation -- it
gives a definite result for definite inputs. It still counts as a
computation even if the same program running on different inputs would
give different results.
I have a lot of trouble seeing that counterfactual correctness is
actually the distinction Bruno needs to make. He wants to distinguish
the active simulation from the passive rerun of the same sequence of
states. Why not just make this distinction, simpliciter?
I am with Liz -- where is the actual contradiction with assuming
physical supervenience? That does not rule out the possibility of
supervenience on an effective simulation -- the simulation is run on a
physical computer, after all!
Bruce
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