meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
The calculation written out on paper is a static thing, but the result
of that calculation might still be part of a simulation that produces
consciousness. Though, unless Barbour is right and the actuality of
time can be statically encoded in his 'time capsules (current memories
of past instances)', I was thinking in terms of a sequence of these
states (however calculated).
Yes, I agree that the computation should not have to halt (compute a
function) in order to instantiate consciousness; it can just be a
sequence of states. Written out on paper it can be a sequence of states
ordered by position on the paper. But that seems absurd, unless you
think of it as consciousness in the context of a world that is also
written out on the paper, such that the writing that is conscious is
/*conscious of*/ this written out world.
My present conscious state includes visual, auditory and tactile inputs
-- these are part of the simulation. But they need simulate only the
effect on my brain states during that moment -- they do not have to
simulate the entire world that gave rise to these inputs. The recreated
conscuious state is not counterfactually accurate in this respect, but
so what? I am reproducing a few conscious moments, not a fully
functional person.
But in the MGA (or Olympia) we are asked to consider a device which is a
conscious AI and then we are led to suppose a radically broken version
of it works even though it is reduced to playing back a record of its
processes. I think the playback of the record fails to produce
consciousness because it is not counterfactually correct and hence is
not actually realizing the states of the AI - those states essentially
include that some branches were not taken. Maudlin's invention of Klara
is intended to overcome this objection and provide a counterfactually
correct but physically inert sequence of states. But I think it Maudlin
underestimates the problem of context and the additions necessary for
counterfactual correctness will extend far beyond "the brain" and entail
a "world". These additions come for free when we say "Yes" to the
doctor replacing part of our brain because the rest of the world that
gave us context is still there. The doctor doesn't remove it.
In the "yes doctor" scenario as reported by Russell, it talks only about
replacing your brain with an AI program on a computer. It does not
mention connecting this to sense organs capable of reproducing all the
inputs one normally gets from the world. If this is not clearly
specified, I would certainly say 'No' to the doctor. There is little
point or future in being a functioning brain without external inputs. As
I recall sensory deprivation experiments, subjects rapidly subside into
a meaningless cycle of states -- or go mad -- in the absence of sensory
stimulation.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
