On 27 Mar 2015, at 00:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know
which one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered
moment was run on one or other or my next anticipated moment will
be run on one or other. If one computer stops it makes no
difference to me and if a third computer running my mind comes
online it makes no difference to me. So effectively there is only
one conscious moment. Under physical supervenience, stopping all
the computers stops the conscious moment.
I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part.
In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience),
and Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness in each
running (but then if we attribute it to the physical activity
token: we get the absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time
consciousness supervene on a static film, etc.
One problem is that this is an invalid "argument from incredulity".
The fact that you find this conclusion absurd is not an argument
against the conclusion: it is merely a statement about how you fell
about the conclusion -- which could be right or wrong, and in either
case does not depend on how you feel about it.
I don't think so. It is more like when a student get an equation with
a number or a function on a number at the right hand side, and a
differential at the other side.
The stroboscope illustrates the non sensicalness to attribute a
consciousness in real time when a movie is performed. It is really non-
sense, unless adding ad-hoc metaphysics and rules, which you can do to
any theory applied to reality.
I think there are important points buried here and I will attempt to
explore them in more detail in another post -- I am rather short of
time today.
I am a platonist beginner, I can wait for eternity but not much more :)
Bruno
Bruce
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