Le 28 mars 2015 01:03, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 27 Mar 2015, at 00:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run on one or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on one or other. If one computer stops it makes no difference to me and if a third computer running my mind comes online it makes no difference to me. So effectively there is only one conscious moment. Under physical supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the conscious moment. >>>> >>>> I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part. >>>> In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience), and Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness in each running (but then if we attribute it to the physical activity token: we get the absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time consciousness supervene on a static film, etc. >>> >>> >>> One problem is that this is an invalid "argument from incredulity". The fact that you find this conclusion absurd is not an argument against the conclusion: it is merely a statement about how you fell about the conclusion -- which could be right or wrong, and in either case does not depend on how you feel about it. >> >> >> I don't think so. It is more like when a student get an equation with a number or a function on a number at the right hand side, and a differential at the other side. >> >> The stroboscope illustrates the non sensicalness to attribute a consciousness in real time when a movie is performed. It is really non-sense, unless adding ad-hoc metaphysics and rules, which you can do to any theory applied to reality. > > > If you start from a set of assumptions and derive a contradiction, then you know that one or more of your assumptions is incorrect. The contradiction in MGA shows that the assumptions are mutually incompatible, but it does not show which assumption is invalid.
And the MGA doesn't pretend to go further than that. They are incompatible, none can be true at the same time, both can be false... It is not an exclusive or. Again Bruno is pursuing the assumption computationalism is true to see where that leads. He has never affirmed that computationalism is true nor that the MGA is a proof of that. Quentin > That is where you appeal to the so-called absurdity of 'consciousness in real time when a movie is performed'. That is the argument from incredulity, and it is invalid. You cannot conclude that from the MGA since it could equally well be concluded that computationalism, or the UD, or anything else in the argument, is incorrect. > > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
