On 28 Mar 2015, at 00:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:
On 3/26/2015 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I don't think even this follows. A computation is a computation -- it gives a definite result for definite inputs. It still counts as a computation even if the same program running on different inputs would give different results.
? Giving different results on different input is what counterfactual correctness implies. A recording is not counterfactually correct because it gives the same output no matter what the input (effectively there is no input). If you don't require counterfactual correctness, i.e. computing the correct answer for different inputs, then a look-up table with just one entry qualifies as a computation.

I understand counterfactual correctness, but I think the concept is misapplied -- even to the extent of making a category error. Counterfactual correctness can be ascribed to a computer/calculator but not to a calculation. A calculator would not be counterfactually correct if it gave the same output for every input, but a calculation is a calculation! It is a single thing -- one output from one input. If you change the input, in general you would get different output. But then that would be different calculation. It is a category error to ask for counterfactual correctness from an individual calculation.

If I do a calculation with pencil and paper, writing out the steps of my calculation, that is still a calculation even after I have finished. It is still the same calculation 10 years later (if the paper is intact). IIt is not counterfactually correct because I do different calculations on different pieces of paper, leaving the original recoded calculation intact. But it is still a calculation -- what else would you call it?

A description of a calculation. It is has different of a calculation than a movie of a murder is different from a murder, even if the movie is "completely precise".




I think this basic confusion between the calculator and the calculation renders the MGA toothless. It does not establish that the recording cannot be conscious. The recording is as much a calculation as the original. If you degrade the film/recording, then you finally lose consciousness, but that is beside the point. It is just like rubbing out or burning your original paper calculation. It is only if you insist that your computing mechanism is counterfactually correct that you can say that a recording cannot reconstitute consciousness, but the computing mechanism is not the calculation that corresponds to consciousness.

But then consciousness is not associated with the running by this or that u, but by its existence only. That was the (perhaps subtle) point we need.

Bruno



Bruce


Brent

I have a lot of trouble seeing that counterfactual correctness is actually the distinction Bruno needs to make. He wants to distinguish the active simulation from the passive rerun of the same sequence of states. Why not just make this distinction, simpliciter?

I am with Liz -- where is the actual contradiction with assuming physical supervenience? That does not rule out the possibility of supervenience on an effective simulation -- the simulation is run on a physical computer, after all!

Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to