On 09 Apr 2015, at 09:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix.
Your 'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett.
Well, if they differ, then either QM is false or comp is false. But
it is the whole point: to make thing precise enough so that we can
compare them.
If you see already that they are different, please give the proof.
As far as I can tell, your 'many worlds, or FPI' comes from the
observation that infinitely many copies of any particular conscious
moment are generated by the dovetailer.
Not really. The DU executes program. if my lmevel is low, it mlight
need the rational (with 10^100 decimals) quantum description of the
Milky Way. As we cannot know our subst level with certainty, the
reasoning must not fix some level a priori.
These occur in different environments, with different continuations,
hence FPI. In comp there is no dynamics relating the different
possible continuations of the moment,
Yes, there is. The dynamics is given by the universal numbers which
run s the computation. They are those linking the computational
states. Then the FPI links the observer moments. Both the computations
and the FPI are at play.
and there is no connection with measurement or measurement outcomes
-- the indeterminacy applies to every conscious moment.
In the Everett of MWI interpretation of QM, you have a deterministic
wave equation (the SE) which determines the evolution of the wave
function. In a measurement interaction, the wave function is
expanded in terms of the complete set of eigvenvectors of the
measurement operator. Each term in this expansion corresponds to a
particular eigenvalue as the result of the measurement. Decoherence
then means that interaction with the environment leads to the
diagonalization of the corresponding density matrix. So what were
once interfering terms in an expansion in Hilbert space evolve into
separate worlds, in each of which a different measurement result
obtains.
I do not see any relationship, or even any real similarity between
these two models, apart from the fact that they both give
indeterminacy in a deterministic model.
The point made is logical. IF comp is true, they have to be the same,
and then the math, up to now, confirms it. It would not if there were
no incompleteness, if Theatetu's theory could not work on Gödel
beweisbar, etc. You need to read the math part, but it is better to
settle the complete UDA first, I think.
Bruno
Bruce
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