On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it.
The primary physical universe certainly exists,
Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a
*primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I
believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here
(for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no
scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object.
There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either.
We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal
dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a
theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the
same sense that prime number exist.
Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings.
In which theory? You assume many things. The axioms I gave on numbers
did not refer to brains or anything physical. I might ask you to put
all your assumption on the table. I think that you confuse numbers,
and human conception of the number. If you explain what is a number by
a human brain, I will ask you to give me a theory of brain not using
the notion of numbers.
Perhaps you meant its existence in a physical universe. But we
don't know if there is a physical universe,
I think we do know that. Your point, it seems, is merely that this
is not primary, not that it doesn't exist.
Yes, I meant "But we don't know if there is a primary physical
universe", which is what you were assuming in your answer.
and the point, to sum up, is that it will be easier to explain the
*appearance* of a physical universe to the entities in arithmetic,
than to explain the appearance of arithmetic to physical beings.
But you haven't explained the appearance of a physical universe in
arithmetic.
? No, I did. All appearances are easily explained, once you assume
comp, and understand that arithmetical truth (a tiny part of it)
emulates all computations, notably the one which we associate
consciousness to. What is hard is to justify the stability, but there
are already non trivial results. And then the point is that we have no
choice in the matter: if comp is true, even if there is a primary
universe, it is useless to invoke it in the explanation.
And the appearance of arithmetic in a physical universe is trivially
easy to explain -- we abstract the numbers from our experience of
objects and of multiple copies of similar objects. No mystery here.
The point of MGA is that such an explanation does not work, even in a
small primary universe.
But the UDA go farer. It shows that if we assume the brain function
like a (natural) machine, then we have no choice (unless adding
some amount of magic).
No need for magic: it is all in the physics.
Then you need to find a flaw in step 7 and/or Step 8.
And so far there is no evidence that it can produce anything like
the physical universe we observe.
This shows you are still not reading the work with the necessary
attention. There are evidences, of different type. I predict the
many worlds appearance a long time before reading Everett and
understanding that QM gives some evidence for computationalism (for
which evidences also exists). Then the math extract a quantum
logic exactly where it must appear.
This is all quite trivial, and unimpressive to the physicist.
Because he seems to abstract away from the mind-body problem. Please
read the proof. Also, getting indeterminacy local non locality, non
cloning, symmetry, and with some luck the non linearity from
elementary arithmetic (+ comp at the meta-level) is a good beginning,
for a theory which does not eliminate consciousness, and explain the
difference between the qualia and the quanta. You forget we find the
quanta at the place UDA says that if comp is true they must appear. It
is not a formalization of the assumed idea of quanta. Most people
thought it was impossible, at the start.
One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix. Your
'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett.
Well, if they differ, then either QM is false or comp is false. But it
is the whole point: to make thing precise enough so that we can
compare them.
If you see already that they are different, please give the proof.
Primary physicality is a lot simpler. Occam's razor to the fore....
Not at all. It assumes a primary physical reality, a mathemaytical
reality, some starnge relation between math and physcis, and
between mind and physics. The TOE extracted from computationalism
assume only elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
The relationship between maths and physics is not at all strange or
mysterious. We evolved in a physical world,
By the MGA, that argument will simply not work.
and postulated numbers and arithmetic to order our experiences.
Same problem. You are using implicitly an hypothesis which can't work.
You need to find a flaw (a real logical one) in the UDA, and then to
invoke a primitive physical universe, and bet that comp is wrong, to
make your point.
Once the idea of axiomatization of arithmetic arose, all the rest
followed. It is intimately related to the physical world because it
originated there --
In your theory, which has been shown to be assume non
computationalism, and thus special actual infinities.
as part of our attempt to understand and systematize our experience
of that physical world.
The goal is not doing physics, but to solve the consciousness problem.
With comp, we have to explain the law of physics by the measure on
computations "seen from inside". You seem to have missed the argument.
Bruno
Bruce
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