On 4/23/2015 2:52 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
In the thread discussing comp the topic of whether uploading is possible came
up. While tangentially related to comp, objections on the grounds of practical
impossibility miss the point. But! The topic is still very interesting.
Is uploading possible? If so, when will we have it?
What fidelity is necessary?
Will the upload still be you?
Would you sign up for a destructive upload? Conservative?
Feel free to toss any other questions into the mix.
For the record, I think uploading is possible, that destructive uploading will
come way sooner,
In a way non-destructive uploading is already her. There's a computer scientist, who name
escapes me at the moment, who has been uploading his wife's memories and personality to an
AI. I've thought for a long time that there's a good business model in simulating elderly
people to "preserve" them for descendants; just a step beyond making video tapes of them
talking about their life.
Brent
I'm uncertain about fidelity, but I do think there could be a functional
isomorphism that doesn't depend on on a structural one, i.e. 100 simplified
neurons might be required to capture the behavior of one physical one. The
substitution level i think is subcellular. I think uploading perserves identity
and I might actually prefer a destructive upload, when I consider the
disappointment of the me that wakes up still flesh and bone after a
conservative upload.
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