On 06 May 2015, at 03:15, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
that it still "computes" in exactly the same way as a physical
computer; and the MGA, which is only an argument from incredulity,
not a logical argument.
Bruce
Rejecting the "move to Platonia" is the non-robust, or small universe
move, that Bruno attributes to Peter Jones (which I think took place
on
this list, but I didn't really notice at the time).
To be clear, I have make the MGA well before Peter Jones made that
move, as I have made the MGA to prevent that move at step 7.
This is supposedly addressed by the MGA (hence the focus of my paper
"MGA Revisited").
This non-robust move is IMHO equivalent to ultrafinitism,
Yes, it is. MGA is for ultrafinitist physicalism. This is still
consistent with UDA1-7.
ie the
notion that some numbers are more real than others (ie the ones that
are too big to fit in the physical universe). Nevertheless,
ultrafinitism is not completely unrespectable, in spite of not being
particularly popular, and has been defended by people like Norman
Wildberger.
Ultrafinitism is invoked (implicitly) by Sean Carroll, with respect to
physical Boltzman Brain.
But MGA shows that he (re--put the mind-body problem under the rug, as
it needs the brain not being Turing emulable.
The MGA does indeed rely on the intuition that a non counterfactually
correct computation does not instantiate a conscious moment. The basis
for this intuition is that if I watch a movie, then I don't think the
images of the actors being portrayed in any way instantiate a
consciousness in the here and now - and that is primarily because if I
ask them questions, the responses are unlikely to make much sense,
unless I accidentally ask just the right question.
The intuition is just that there is no computation at all made in the
movie. It is a description, without any interpretation possible. The
same movie can represent different computation on different computers.
Where it all gets muddy is if we consider a sufficiently detailed
recording of a series of physical states that instantiates a conscious
entity, and then replay the recording so that the exact same sequence
of physical states is reproduced (to within the substitution level of
accuracy).
Then we can ask whether the conscious moment is instantiated. Clearly,
it is not in the here and now,
Good, that is the point.
via the above argument, but what about
in the there and then? If the conscious moment were different there
and
then, then the recording would have to be different, so we do have
supervenience on the physical recording.
Supervenience always mean "here and now".
Before MGA you can attach consciousness of time t and space x to the
computer state at time t and space x; but after MGA you attach
"consciousness of time t and x" to all atemporal aphysical computation
giving the impression of "time t and space x" in the indexical way.
Bruno
To drive a contradiction, we need to consider the possibility that the
physical recording arises ab initio, ie without the original observer
moment ever having existed. But such a circumstance is incredibly
improbable for the likely complexity, sort of Boltzmann brain on
steroids, that the only way it will happen is if Platonia really
existed in the first place.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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