On 09 May 2015, at 02:42, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:45:53PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, May 7, 2015 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
In the case of chaotic systems (or Og for that matter), a
hypothetical Laplace daemon could simulate the system using exact
initial conditions
Even if we ignore Quantum Mechanics that would still be untrue
because
today we know something that Laplace did not: even very small
changes in
initial conditions can increase the number of calculations required
to make
a prediction enormously, it will increase them to infinity if space
or time
is continuous. And today we know that even in theory it takes time
and
energy to make a calculation, and the faster you make it the more
energy
you need. If you calculate too slowly the event you're trying to
predict
will have already happened before you finish, and if you calculate
too
quickly you produce so much waste heat you'll alter the system you're
trying to predict.
That is an interesting objection, but not one that's really relevant
to the case at hand (distinguising dynamical chaos from teh FPI).
and tell you what will be experienced next.
And even if we ignore the above objection the daemon might know
what we
will do next but the daemon couldn't tell us because then the
daemon's own
behavior would alter the prediction; I might be of a argumentative
frame of
mind and be determined to do the exact opposite of whatever the
daemon said
I was going to do. In that case to figure out what I would do a
mega-daemon
would be required to figure out what the daemon was going to predict.
Obviously before long we'd need a mega-mega-daemon and so on.
Assuming Og has free will, of course. If he doesn't, then it doesn't
matter what Laplace's daemon tells him.
With FPI, Laplace's daemon cannot do that.
Not even an infinite string of mega, mega-mega, mega-mega-mega.....
daemons
can answer gibberish questions.
True, but you're implying that what my next experience is is a
gibberish question, when it clearly isn't. What's more, I can find out
just by waiting a bit.
the third person answer will always be probabilistic. What I see
in the
first person not probabalistic.
In physics everything is probabilistic and we live in a world
governed by
the laws of physics.
It is definite, and I only need to wait around to find out.
And Turing tells us that for some things, like figuring out if a
program
will stop, you'll have to wait around for a infinite, and not just
astronomically large, number of years and even then you still won't
find
out if it stops or not.
Sure - another difference between FPI and the Halting theorem.
nobody knows how to make a Turing Machine or a computer or how
to make one single calculation without using matter that operates
according
to the laws of physics. Maybe there is some other way to do it
but if there
is nobody knows what it is.
IMHO, one can never know what it is made out of.
That is equivalent to saying the blunders in Bruno's "proof" can
never be repaired.
Hardly - that is the result at step 7, nothing to do with your so-
called
"blunders". IMHO, one can go there directly
in one step, as it is a pretty obvious conclusion from the CT
thesis.
Pretty obvious? I agree that any finite program that terminates can
be
calculated on a Turing Machine, but there is in general no way to
know if
any given program will terminate or not, and nobody has the
slightest idea
how to make a Turing Machine, or even anything close to it, without
using
matter that obeys the laws of physics.
What does that have to do with "one can never know what it is made
out of."?
If I am a computation, I cannot tell whether I'm running on a PC
or a Mac
I remind you that both the Mac and the PC are made of matter that
obeys the
laws of physics.
So? Relevance? I also cannot tell if I'm am running Robinson
arithmetic or SK combinators.
the precise properties of the ontological material reality (Bruno
primitive reality) are not accessible to us
I don't need to know what the ultimate primitive reality is
(assuming such
a thing even exists), I just need to know the relative primitivity of
physics and mathematics. Unless Bruno can show that mathematics is
more
primitive than matter and has found a way to make a calculation that
doesn't involve physics his "proof" is just an exercise in
circularity.
UDA 1-7 shows that whatever the ultimate primitive reality is,
properties of matter (ie physics) must only depend on the fact that
the
ultimate primitive reality is capable of universal computation.
Assuming comp, of course, and robustness of the primitive reality
(that a UD is supported).
OK. With step UDA 1-7, you get the reversal with comp + there exist a
primitive robust physical universe.
That is why he says arithmetic suffices.
Using a strong OCCAM razor, as not enough physics has been derived
yet. That is why MGA will be used to eliminate that string use of OCCAM.
Note that the arithmetical reality, even the tiny one needed for the
start (RA) is provably "robust", in the sense that it contains the
emulation of the UD entire activity, with the redundancies and the
logical structures of the points of view.
Of course you can insists
that your ulimate reality is running on something physical like
gears/cogs, or electrons in silicon, but nothing about the
"geariness", or "electronicness" is important to the physical reality
we observe. It is an unnecessary hypothethis.
So we come to what happens if the primitive reality is not robust
(which seems rather likely if you're insisting on it being made out of
cogs, but not if the MWI is valid. That is where the MGA steps in.
Bruno, on the other hand has TOEs for sale.
As of today nobody's TOE is worth a bucket of warm spit, none of
them work
worth a damn.
Pick one, any one, they'll all do your computations for you.
No you pick one and then use it to calculate 2+2 for me without using
matter or any of the laws of physics.
I'll let Bruno do that with RA, but I expect it be pretty simple.
I gave that as exercise to Liz sometime ago, and she solved the
problem without any difficulties.
I do it is someone insisted, but it is very simple.
Unfortunately, there will be the objection that I use my "material
brain", or "material paper", etc. Which is a confusion of level. The
cimputation, as defined in computer science, is a the mathematical
object provably existing in the same sense as the existence of prime
numbers, but to show a computation, we need to go through
descriptions, and between physical being, we will use the physical
means.
That confusion level error that I want to prevent here would be the
same as a guy saying that neurophysiology is absurd because all the
theories on how the brain might function are using brain!
we know that Bruno's Platonic integers have never been shown to
be able
to calculate anything, we have zero evidence they can do anything
without physics, but we have an astronomical amount of evidence
that
matter operating according to the laws of physics can make
calculations.
I gather arithmetic has been proven capable of universal
computation
Nonsense. As of today if the laws of physics are not involved
nobody has
ever been able to calculate ANYTHING. That's why people still make
computer
hardware.
Bruno - can you provide a citation to John. He clearly doesn't
believe you.
I will, but I think that is comment already makes this non necessary.
He makes people believe that if comp2 was true we would not need to
make hardware, which shows that he miss the point entirely.
It is hard to say a citation, as it is the real base of doing
mathematics. He needs to understand what is a universal machine.
I can only give examples, and I gave the three following theories or
system: RA, (and thus PA, ZF, ...), the SK-combinators, and the Putnam-
Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones system of polynomials relation.
All computations are realized in all model of those relations,
theories, etc.
The Turing universality of such systems is prived in good textbooks.
I still don't get it, even today one computer can run 2 separate
programs simultaneously, so what's your point?
But it can't simultaneous experience being two different persons.
Why not?
Because then it would be experiencing being a mad person, not either
of
the original two.
it is important to delve into what supervenience_actually_ means
You're the one who keeps using it so you tell me what supervenience
_actually_ means.
Read my paper, and read the Stanford Plato article on
supervenience. The margin on this email is too small...
Conscious experience "then and there" supervenes on the recording
just
as much as the original computation
I think you're overusing that word. If X supervenes on Y I assume
you
mean X causes Y,
No I don't. Read my paper.
and I know what consciousness means even if I can't define
it, but in the context of Virtual Reality and a conscious AI
program that
can be stopped reset and rerun what does "then and there" mean?
The coordinates of virtual space & time, obviously.
it is clear that supervenience of conscious experience "here and
now"
does not supervene on the recording,
Recomputing the conscious AI program makes zero subjective
difference and
playing back a recording makes zero subjective difference. And to the
conscious AI program "here and now" only has meaning relative to
places
things and events inside the virtual world the conscious AI program
lives
in.
Absolutely. I think you might be getting it. Maybe...
You're probably wondering why this is even relevant. Bruno's
definition of physical supervenience (you have to read the original
MGA papers,or his thesis, in French unfortunately, unless anyone can
point to an English language expression of it.
Of course Maudlin doesn't define his physical supervenience in quite
that way. His has more to do with physical activity.
What Maudlin, and many materialist called simply supervenience (in the
mind-body problem context), is what I call physical supervenience. But
as we are led to a a comp supervenience without "matter", I use
supervenience in a more general sense than in the (materialist)
physical sense, and always made precise if it is the physical or the
comp or arithmetical one.
Bruno
PS I have to go. Some heavy Sunday and Monday, might answer more
slowly, or with more typo errors, apology in advance.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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