On Thu, May 7, 2015 Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> When a recording of consciousness is played back does the consciousness >> exist during the playback or just when the computer was actually making >> calculations? If computationalism is true, and I think it is, then the >> answer to that question doesn't make any subjective difference whatsoever. > > > > Exactly. That was one of my points. > It was? Well that simplifies things considerably because I was only trying to make 2 key points and that was one of them, the other was that Bruno's and your entire argument hinges on the existence of a computer made of MATTER that operates according to PHYSICAL law. > >> There is nothing new in this, Turing proved 80 years ago that in >> general the behavior of even very simple programs can not be predicted, if >> you want to know what it will do all you can do is watch. > > > > This is not the same result as the halting theorem, to which you > are presumably referring. > Why not, what on earth is the difference? > >> And Og the caveman discovered that people don't always know what they >> will see next so I see no reason for a new homemade acronym like "FPI". > > > > Because Og the caveman is more likely to be describing the results of a > chaotic system rather than FPI. > Who cares? In this case Og is the first person and maybe Og doesn't know what he can see next because his senses haven't given him sufficient information to make a good prediction, or maybe the calculations of chaos are too difficult as you said, or maybe because he can't solve the Halting Problem, or maybe it's because every event simply doesn't have a cause; it doesn't matter, regardless of the reason the fact remains the first person doesn't know what will happen next. > > Why is what I'll experience next a gibberish question? Asking what Russell Standish will experience next is not a gibberish question, but in this context, which is about as far from everyday context as you can get, asking what "I" will experience next most certainly is a gibberish question. > >> So at the very start you've got to assume the existence of a >> physical universe and a very special type of physical universe. Does this >> mean physics is more fundamental than mathematics? > > > > Not really. It just makes the arguments easier to make at that point. > Wow, talk about an understatement! Making the existence of a computer made of matter that operates according to the laws of physics an axiom makes your and Bruno's points infinitely (not just astronomically ) easier to make. > >> it still could not of course predict what "you" will see next because >> in this context that personal pronoun has no >> meaning, it would be like asking what klogknee will fluxanate next. > > > > I disagree. What I experience next has a quite specific meaning It's fine for common usage but matter duplication machines are not common nor are discussions about dovetailer computers that create the multiverse. > > and I'll find out by waiting around long enough. Who is Mr. I'll? In the dovetail scenario everything that could happen to Russell Standish will happen to Russell Standish, but which one is Mr. I? > >> But there is one physical substrate that is still of critical >> importance, the substrate out of which your dovetailer machine is built >> because nobody knows how to make a Turing Machine or a computer or how to >> make one single calculation without using matter that operates according to >> the laws of physics. Maybe there is some other way to do it but if there is >> nobody >> knows what it is. > > > > IMHO, one can never know what it is made out of. That is equivalent to saying the blunders in Bruno's "proof" can never be repaired. > > Our universe could be running on a range of different hardware, and we'd > be none the wiser. It could be Bruno's Platonic integers for all we could > tell. > We have much to learn but we are not completely ignorant on this issue, we know that Bruno's Platonic integers have never been shown to be able to calculate anything, we have zero evidence they can do anything without physics, but we have an astronomical amount of evidence that matter operating according to the laws of physics can make calculations. > > I have no idea what you're talking about here, if one person effects >> the class the other class members will effect it too. > > > > That is not what I'm saying. If I experience being Alice within > the class, then I'm experiencing something different to the case if > I'm experiencing being Bob in the class at the exact same moment. > Two different conscious experiences, exact same physical state. > I still don't get it, even today one computer can run 2 separate programs simultaneously, so what's your point? > > It is meant to be some sort of intuition pump, just like Searle's Chinese > Room. Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is not just wrong it's STUPID. I say this because it has 3 colossal flaws, just one would render it stupid and 3 render it stupidity cubed: 1) It assumes that a small part of a system has all the properties of the entire system. 2) It assumes that slowing down consciousness would not make things strange and that strange things can not exist. Yes it's strange that a room considered as a whole can be conscious, but it would also be strange if the grey goo inside your head was slowed down by a factor of a hundred thousand million billion trillion. 3) This is the stupidest reason of the lot. Searle wants to prove that mechanical things may behave intelligently but only humans can be conscious. Searle starts by showing successfully that the Chinese Room does indeed behave intelligently, but then he concludes that no consciousness was involved in the operation of that intelligent room. How does he reach that conclusion? I will tell you. Searle assumes that mechanical things may behave intelligently but only humans can be conscious, and it is perfectly true that the little man is not aware of what's going on, therefore Searle concludes that consciousness was not involved in that intelligence. Searle assumes that if consciousness of Chinese exists anywhere in that room it can only be in the human and since the human is not conscious of Chinese he concludes consciousness was not involved, and by assuming the very thing he wants to prove he has only succeeded in proving that he's an idiot. And now let me tell you about Clark's Chinese Room: You are a professor of Chinese Literature and are in a room with me and the great Chinese Philosopher and Poet Laozi. Laozi writes something in his native language on a paper and hands it to me. I walk 10 feet and give it to you. You read the paper and are impressed with the wisdom of the message and the beauty of its language. Now I tell you that I don't know a word of Chinese; can you find any deep philosophical implications from that fact? I believe Clark's Chinese Room is every bit as profound as Searle's Chinese Room. Not very. > > The whole business of the recording is how can that physical > apparatus replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is > not aware of the environment. Who cares? At the very beginning of your post you said you agreed with me that it's irrelevant if the machine replaying the consciousness is really producing consciousness or not. I said " When a recording of consciousness is played back does the consciousness exist during the playback or just when the computer was actually making calculations? If computationalism is true, and I think it is, then the answer to that question doesn't make any subjective difference whatsoever" and you responded with "Exactly. That was one of my points". It's difficult enough trying to answer questions that matter so lets not worry about questions that don't matter until we've figured out the important stuff. > > Replaying the recording makes no difference whatsoever. And recomputing the entire AI program makes no subjective difference either, one is as unimportant as the other. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
