On Sun, May 10, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> What computer scientists like Turing and others have proven is that if >> matter is organized in a X manner then computations Y can be performed, but >> nobody, absolutely positively NOBODY has come withing a billion light years >> of figuring out how to add 1+1 without using matter and the laws of >> physics. > > > > What Turing & Al have proven is that the arithmetical reality emulates > all computation. >
No, what they proved is that physical reality can emulate arithmetic; and one sort of physical reality, like a electronic computer, can emulate another sort of physical reality, like a galaxy, but we have no evidence that arithmetic can emulate anything. > > You can use this in the physical reality because we have good evidence > that the physical reality is Turing universal. > You can ONLY use this in physical reality because that is the only thing we know of that is Turing universal; that's the reason computer hardware companies have manufacturing costs that are not zero, and that's the only reason. > > The fact that you need a physical computer, or a brain, to enacted > computation relatively to the physical reality is not an argument that the > computation, notably those related to us, is not due to the one done in > arithmetic > I disagree, I think it's an excellent argument that arithmetic without matter that obeys the laws of physics can't do anything, in fact it would be hard to imagine a stronger argument. > (once you agree that 2+2=4 is a simpole truth on which we can agree on). > We may agree on that but Godel and Turing tell us that there are an infinite number of mathematical statements we will NEVER agree on, mathematical statements that even mathematics doesn't know if they are true or not. And since there is no way for ANYTHING to separate all true statements from all false statements even Platonia contains an infinite amount of Bullshit. John K Clark > > Bruno > > > > > > > John K Clark > > > > > > but to show a computation, we need to go through descriptions, and > between physical being, we will use the physical means. > > That confusion level error that I want to prevent here would be the same > as a guy saying that neurophysiology is absurd because all the theories on > how the brain might function are using brain! > > > > > > >> On 09 May 2015, at 02:42, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:45:53PM -0400, John Clark wrote: >>> >>>> On Thu, May 7, 2015 Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> In the case of chaotic systems (or Og for that matter), a >>>>> hypothetical Laplace daemon could simulate the system using exact >>>>> initial conditions >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Even if we ignore Quantum Mechanics that would still be untrue because >>>> today we know something that Laplace did not: even very small changes in >>>> initial conditions can increase the number of calculations required to >>>> make >>>> a prediction enormously, it will increase them to infinity if space or >>>> time >>>> is continuous. And today we know that even in theory it takes time and >>>> energy to make a calculation, and the faster you make it the more energy >>>> you need. If you calculate too slowly the event you're trying to predict >>>> will have already happened before you finish, and if you calculate too >>>> quickly you produce so much waste heat you'll alter the system you're >>>> trying to predict. >>>> >>>> >>> That is an interesting objection, but not one that's really relevant >>> to the case at hand (distinguising dynamical chaos from teh FPI). >>> >>> >>>> and tell you what will be experienced next. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> And even if we ignore the above objection the daemon might know what we >>>> will do next but the daemon couldn't tell us because then the daemon's >>>> own >>>> behavior would alter the prediction; I might be of a argumentative >>>> frame of >>>> mind and be determined to do the exact opposite of whatever the daemon >>>> said >>>> I was going to do. In that case to figure out what I would do a >>>> mega-daemon >>>> would be required to figure out what the daemon was going to predict. >>>> Obviously before long we'd need a mega-mega-daemon and so on. >>>> >>>> >>> Assuming Og has free will, of course. If he doesn't, then it doesn't >>> matter what Laplace's daemon tells him. >>> >>> >>>> With FPI, Laplace's daemon cannot do that. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not even an infinite string of mega, mega-mega, mega-mega-mega..... >>>> daemons >>>> can answer gibberish questions. >>>> >>>> >>> True, but you're implying that what my next experience is is a >>> gibberish question, when it clearly isn't. What's more, I can find out >>> just by waiting a bit. >>> >>> >>>> the third person answer will always be probabilistic. What I see in >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>> first person not probabalistic. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In physics everything is probabilistic and we live in a world governed >>>> by >>>> the laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> It is definite, and I only need to wait around to find out. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> And Turing tells us that for some things, like figuring out if a program >>>> will stop, you'll have to wait around for a infinite, and not just >>>> astronomically large, number of years and even then you still won't find >>>> out if it stops or not. >>>> >>>> >>> Sure - another difference between FPI and the Halting theorem. >>> >>> nobody knows how to make a Turing Machine or a computer or how >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to make one single calculation without using matter that operates >>>>>> according >>>>>> to the laws of physics. Maybe there is some other way to do it but if >>>>>> there >>>>>> is nobody knows what it is. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> IMHO, one can never know what it is made out of. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> That is equivalent to saying the blunders in Bruno's "proof" can >>>>>>> >>>>>> never be repaired. >>>>> >>>>> Hardly - that is the result at step 7, nothing to do with your >>>>>> so-called >>>>>> >>>>> "blunders". IMHO, one can go there directly >>>>> in one step, as it is a pretty obvious conclusion from the CT thesis. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Pretty obvious? I agree that any finite program that terminates can be >>>> calculated on a Turing Machine, but there is in general no way to know >>>> if >>>> any given program will terminate or not, and nobody has the slightest >>>> idea >>>> how to make a Turing Machine, or even anything close to it, without >>>> using >>>> matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>> What does that have to do with "one can never know what it is made out >>> of."? >>> >>> >>>> If I am a computation, I cannot tell whether I'm running on a PC or a >>>>>> Mac >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I remind you that both the Mac and the PC are made of matter that obeys >>>> the >>>> laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>> So? Relevance? I also cannot tell if I'm am running Robinson >>> arithmetic or SK combinators. >>> >>> >>>> the precise properties of the ontological material reality (Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> primitive reality) are not accessible to us >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't need to know what the ultimate primitive reality is (assuming >>>> such >>>> a thing even exists), I just need to know the relative primitivity of >>>> physics and mathematics. Unless Bruno can show that mathematics is more >>>> primitive than matter and has found a way to make a calculation that >>>> doesn't involve physics his "proof" is just an exercise in circularity. >>>> >>>> >>> UDA 1-7 shows that whatever the ultimate primitive reality is, >>> properties of matter (ie physics) must only depend on the fact that the >>> ultimate primitive reality is capable of universal computation. >>> >>> Assuming comp, of course, and robustness of the primitive reality >>> (that a UD is supported). >>> >> >> OK. With step UDA 1-7, you get the reversal with comp + there exist a >> primitive robust physical universe. >> >> >> >> >>> That is why he says arithmetic suffices. >>> >> >> Using a strong OCCAM razor, as not enough physics has been derived yet. >> That is why MGA will be used to eliminate that string use of OCCAM. >> >> Note that the arithmetical reality, even the tiny one needed for the >> start (RA) is provably "robust", in the sense that it contains the >> emulation of the UD entire activity, with the redundancies and the logical >> structures of the points of view. >> >> >> >> Of course you can insists >>> that your ulimate reality is running on something physical like >>> gears/cogs, or electrons in silicon, but nothing about the >>> "geariness", or "electronicness" is important to the physical reality >>> we observe. It is an unnecessary hypothethis. >>> >>> So we come to what happens if the primitive reality is not robust >>> (which seems rather likely if you're insisting on it being made out of >>> cogs, but not if the MWI is valid. That is where the MGA steps in. >>> >>> >>>> Bruno, on the other hand has TOEs for sale. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> As of today nobody's TOE is worth a bucket of warm spit, none of them >>>> work >>>> worth a damn. >>>> >>>> >>>> Pick one, any one, they'll all do your computations for you. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> No you pick one and then use it to calculate 2+2 for me without using >>>> matter or any of the laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>> I'll let Bruno do that with RA, but I expect it be pretty simple. >>> >> >> I gave that as exercise to Liz sometime ago, and she solved the problem >> without any difficulties. >> >> I do it is someone insisted, but it is very simple. >> >> Unfortunately, there will be the objection that I use my "material >> brain", or "material paper", etc. Which is a confusion of level. The >> cimputation, as defined in computer science, is a the mathematical object >> provably existing in the same sense as the existence of prime numbers, but >> to show a computation, we need to go through descriptions, and between >> physical being, we will use the physical means. >> >> That confusion level error that I want to prevent here would be the same >> as a guy saying that neurophysiology is absurd because all the theories on >> how the brain might function are using brain! >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> we know that Bruno's Platonic integers have never been shown to be able >>>>>>> >>>>>> to calculate anything, we have zero evidence they can do anything >>>>>> without physics, but we have an astronomical amount of evidence that >>>>>> matter operating according to the laws of physics can make >>>>>> calculations. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I gather arithmetic has been proven capable of universal computation >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> Nonsense. As of today if the laws of physics are not involved nobody has >>>> ever been able to calculate ANYTHING. That's why people still make >>>> computer >>>> hardware. >>>> >>>> >>> Bruno - can you provide a citation to John. He clearly doesn't believe >>> you. >>> >> >> I will, but I think that is comment already makes this non necessary. He >> makes people believe that if comp2 was true we would not need to make >> hardware, which shows that he miss the point entirely. >> >> It is hard to say a citation, as it is the real base of doing >> mathematics. He needs to understand what is a universal machine. >> >> I can only give examples, and I gave the three following theories or >> system: RA, (and thus PA, ZF, ...), the SK-combinators, and the >> Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones system of polynomials relation. >> >> All computations are realized in all model of those relations, theories, >> etc. >> >> The Turing universality of such systems is prived in good textbooks. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>>> I still don't get it, even today one computer can run 2 separate >>>>>> programs simultaneously, so what's your point? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But it can't simultaneous experience being two different persons. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Why not? >>>> >>>> >>> Because then it would be experiencing being a mad person, not either of >>> the original two. >>> >>> >>>> it is important to delve into what supervenience_actually_ means >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> You're the one who keeps using it so you tell me what supervenience >>>> _actually_ means. >>>> >>>> >>> Read my paper, and read the Stanford Plato article on >>> supervenience. The margin on this email is too small... >>> >>> >>>> Conscious experience "then and there" supervenes on the recording just >>>>>> >>>>> as much as the original computation >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I think you're overusing that word. If X supervenes on Y I assume you >>>> mean X causes Y, >>>> >>> >>> No I don't. Read my paper. >>> >>> and I know what consciousness means even if I can't define >>> >>>> it, but in the context of Virtual Reality and a conscious AI program >>>> that >>>> can be stopped reset and rerun what does "then and there" mean? >>>> >>>> >>> The coordinates of virtual space & time, obviously. >>> >>> >>>> it is clear that supervenience of conscious experience "here and now" >>>>>> >>>>> does not supervene on the recording, >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Recomputing the conscious AI program makes zero subjective difference >>>> and >>>> playing back a recording makes zero subjective difference. And to the >>>> conscious AI program "here and now" only has meaning relative to places >>>> things and events inside the virtual world the conscious AI program >>>> lives >>>> in. >>>> >>>> >>> Absolutely. I think you might be getting it. Maybe... >>> >>> You're probably wondering why this is even relevant. Bruno's >>> definition of physical supervenience (you have to read the original >>> MGA papers,or his thesis, in French unfortunately, unless anyone can >>> point to an English language expression of it. >>> >>> Of course Maudlin doesn't define his physical supervenience in quite >>> that way. His has more to do with physical activity. >>> >> >> What Maudlin, and many materialist called simply supervenience (in the >> mind-body problem context), is what I call physical supervenience. But as >> we are led to a a comp supervenience without "matter", I use supervenience >> in a more general sense than in the (materialist) physical sense, and >> always made precise if it is the physical or the comp or arithmetical one. >> >> Bruno >> >> PS I have to go. Some heavy Sunday and Monday, might answer more slowly, >> or with more typo errors, apology in advance. >> >> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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