On Sat, May 9, 2015 at Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > The cimputation, as defined in computer science, is a the mathematical > object provably existing in the same sense as the existence of prime > numbers,
What computer scientists like Turing and others have proven is that if matter is organized in a X manner then computations Y can be performed, but nobody, absolutely positively NOBODY has come withing a billion light years of figuring out how to add 1+1 without using matter and the laws of physics. John K Clark but to show a computation, we need to go through descriptions, and between physical being, we will use the physical means. That confusion level error that I want to prevent here would be the same as a guy saying that neurophysiology is absurd because all the theories on how the brain might function are using brain! > On 09 May 2015, at 02:42, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:45:53PM -0400, John Clark wrote: >> >>> On Thu, May 7, 2015 Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> In the case of chaotic systems (or Og for that matter), a >>>> hypothetical Laplace daemon could simulate the system using exact >>>> initial conditions >>>> >>>> >>> Even if we ignore Quantum Mechanics that would still be untrue because >>> today we know something that Laplace did not: even very small changes in >>> initial conditions can increase the number of calculations required to >>> make >>> a prediction enormously, it will increase them to infinity if space or >>> time >>> is continuous. And today we know that even in theory it takes time and >>> energy to make a calculation, and the faster you make it the more energy >>> you need. If you calculate too slowly the event you're trying to predict >>> will have already happened before you finish, and if you calculate too >>> quickly you produce so much waste heat you'll alter the system you're >>> trying to predict. >>> >>> >> That is an interesting objection, but not one that's really relevant >> to the case at hand (distinguising dynamical chaos from teh FPI). >> >> >>> and tell you what will be experienced next. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> And even if we ignore the above objection the daemon might know what we >>> will do next but the daemon couldn't tell us because then the daemon's >>> own >>> behavior would alter the prediction; I might be of a argumentative frame >>> of >>> mind and be determined to do the exact opposite of whatever the daemon >>> said >>> I was going to do. In that case to figure out what I would do a >>> mega-daemon >>> would be required to figure out what the daemon was going to predict. >>> Obviously before long we'd need a mega-mega-daemon and so on. >>> >>> >> Assuming Og has free will, of course. If he doesn't, then it doesn't >> matter what Laplace's daemon tells him. >> >> >>> With FPI, Laplace's daemon cannot do that. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> Not even an infinite string of mega, mega-mega, mega-mega-mega..... >>> daemons >>> can answer gibberish questions. >>> >>> >> True, but you're implying that what my next experience is is a >> gibberish question, when it clearly isn't. What's more, I can find out >> just by waiting a bit. >> >> >>> the third person answer will always be probabilistic. What I see in the >>>>> >>>> first person not probabalistic. >>>> >>> >>> >>> In physics everything is probabilistic and we live in a world governed by >>> the laws of physics. >>> >>> >>> It is definite, and I only need to wait around to find out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> And Turing tells us that for some things, like figuring out if a program >>> will stop, you'll have to wait around for a infinite, and not just >>> astronomically large, number of years and even then you still won't find >>> out if it stops or not. >>> >>> >> Sure - another difference between FPI and the Halting theorem. >> >> nobody knows how to make a Turing Machine or a computer or how >>>>>>> >>>>>> to make one single calculation without using matter that operates >>>>> according >>>>> to the laws of physics. Maybe there is some other way to do it but if >>>>> there >>>>> is nobody knows what it is. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> IMHO, one can never know what it is made out of. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> That is equivalent to saying the blunders in Bruno's "proof" can >>>>>> >>>>> never be repaired. >>>> >>>> Hardly - that is the result at step 7, nothing to do with your >>>>> so-called >>>>> >>>> "blunders". IMHO, one can go there directly >>>> in one step, as it is a pretty obvious conclusion from the CT thesis. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Pretty obvious? I agree that any finite program that terminates can be >>> calculated on a Turing Machine, but there is in general no way to know if >>> any given program will terminate or not, and nobody has the slightest >>> idea >>> how to make a Turing Machine, or even anything close to it, without using >>> matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>> >>> >> What does that have to do with "one can never know what it is made out >> of."? >> >> >>> If I am a computation, I cannot tell whether I'm running on a PC or a >>>>> Mac >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> I remind you that both the Mac and the PC are made of matter that obeys >>> the >>> laws of physics. >>> >>> >> So? Relevance? I also cannot tell if I'm am running Robinson >> arithmetic or SK combinators. >> >> >>> the precise properties of the ontological material reality (Bruno >>>>> >>>> primitive reality) are not accessible to us >>>> >>> >>> >>> I don't need to know what the ultimate primitive reality is (assuming >>> such >>> a thing even exists), I just need to know the relative primitivity of >>> physics and mathematics. Unless Bruno can show that mathematics is more >>> primitive than matter and has found a way to make a calculation that >>> doesn't involve physics his "proof" is just an exercise in circularity. >>> >>> >> UDA 1-7 shows that whatever the ultimate primitive reality is, >> properties of matter (ie physics) must only depend on the fact that the >> ultimate primitive reality is capable of universal computation. >> >> Assuming comp, of course, and robustness of the primitive reality >> (that a UD is supported). >> > > OK. With step UDA 1-7, you get the reversal with comp + there exist a > primitive robust physical universe. > > > > >> That is why he says arithmetic suffices. >> > > Using a strong OCCAM razor, as not enough physics has been derived yet. > That is why MGA will be used to eliminate that string use of OCCAM. > > Note that the arithmetical reality, even the tiny one needed for the start > (RA) is provably "robust", in the sense that it contains the emulation of > the UD entire activity, with the redundancies and the logical structures of > the points of view. > > > > Of course you can insists >> that your ulimate reality is running on something physical like >> gears/cogs, or electrons in silicon, but nothing about the >> "geariness", or "electronicness" is important to the physical reality >> we observe. It is an unnecessary hypothethis. >> >> So we come to what happens if the primitive reality is not robust >> (which seems rather likely if you're insisting on it being made out of >> cogs, but not if the MWI is valid. That is where the MGA steps in. >> >> >>> Bruno, on the other hand has TOEs for sale. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> As of today nobody's TOE is worth a bucket of warm spit, none of them >>> work >>> worth a damn. >>> >>> >>> Pick one, any one, they'll all do your computations for you. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> No you pick one and then use it to calculate 2+2 for me without using >>> matter or any of the laws of physics. >>> >>> >> I'll let Bruno do that with RA, but I expect it be pretty simple. >> > > I gave that as exercise to Liz sometime ago, and she solved the problem > without any difficulties. > > I do it is someone insisted, but it is very simple. > > Unfortunately, there will be the objection that I use my "material brain", > or "material paper", etc. Which is a confusion of level. The cimputation, > as defined in computer science, is a the mathematical object provably > existing in the same sense as the existence of prime numbers, but to show a > computation, we need to go through descriptions, and between physical > being, we will use the physical means. > > That confusion level error that I want to prevent here would be the same > as a guy saying that neurophysiology is absurd because all the theories on > how the brain might function are using brain! > > > > >> >>> we know that Bruno's Platonic integers have never been shown to be able >>>>>> >>>>> to calculate anything, we have zero evidence they can do anything >>>>> without physics, but we have an astronomical amount of evidence that >>>>> matter operating according to the laws of physics can make >>>>> calculations. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I gather arithmetic has been proven capable of universal computation >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> Nonsense. As of today if the laws of physics are not involved nobody has >>> ever been able to calculate ANYTHING. That's why people still make >>> computer >>> hardware. >>> >>> >> Bruno - can you provide a citation to John. He clearly doesn't believe >> you. >> > > I will, but I think that is comment already makes this non necessary. He > makes people believe that if comp2 was true we would not need to make > hardware, which shows that he miss the point entirely. > > It is hard to say a citation, as it is the real base of doing mathematics. > He needs to understand what is a universal machine. > > I can only give examples, and I gave the three following theories or > system: RA, (and thus PA, ZF, ...), the SK-combinators, and the > Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones system of polynomials relation. > > All computations are realized in all model of those relations, theories, > etc. > > The Turing universality of such systems is prived in good textbooks. > > > > > > > > > >> >>>> I still don't get it, even today one computer can run 2 separate >>>>> programs simultaneously, so what's your point? >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But it can't simultaneous experience being two different persons. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> Why not? >>> >>> >> Because then it would be experiencing being a mad person, not either of >> the original two. >> >> >>> it is important to delve into what supervenience_actually_ means >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> You're the one who keeps using it so you tell me what supervenience >>> _actually_ means. >>> >>> >> Read my paper, and read the Stanford Plato article on >> supervenience. The margin on this email is too small... >> >> >>> Conscious experience "then and there" supervenes on the recording just >>>>> >>>> as much as the original computation >>>> >>>> >>> I think you're overusing that word. If X supervenes on Y I assume you >>> mean X causes Y, >>> >> >> No I don't. Read my paper. >> >> and I know what consciousness means even if I can't define >> >>> it, but in the context of Virtual Reality and a conscious AI program that >>> can be stopped reset and rerun what does "then and there" mean? >>> >>> >> The coordinates of virtual space & time, obviously. >> >> >>> it is clear that supervenience of conscious experience "here and now" >>>>> >>>> does not supervene on the recording, >>>> >>> >>> >>> Recomputing the conscious AI program makes zero subjective difference and >>> playing back a recording makes zero subjective difference. And to the >>> conscious AI program "here and now" only has meaning relative to places >>> things and events inside the virtual world the conscious AI program lives >>> in. >>> >>> >> Absolutely. I think you might be getting it. Maybe... >> >> You're probably wondering why this is even relevant. Bruno's >> definition of physical supervenience (you have to read the original >> MGA papers,or his thesis, in French unfortunately, unless anyone can >> point to an English language expression of it. >> >> Of course Maudlin doesn't define his physical supervenience in quite >> that way. His has more to do with physical activity. >> > > What Maudlin, and many materialist called simply supervenience (in the > mind-body problem context), is what I call physical supervenience. But as > we are led to a a comp supervenience without "matter", I use supervenience > in a more general sense than in the (materialist) physical sense, and > always made precise if it is the physical or the comp or arithmetical one. > > Bruno > > PS I have to go. Some heavy Sunday and Monday, might answer more slowly, > or with more typo errors, apology in advance. > > >> -- >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >> Principal, High Performance Coders >> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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