On 14 May 2015, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 02:33:06PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
3. A recording of (2) supra being played back.
Nobody would call that a computation, except to evade comp's
consequences.
I do, because it is a computation, albeit a rather trivial one.
Yes, like a rock, in some theory of rock. It is not relevant for the
argument.
It is
not to evade comp's consequences, however, which I already accept from
UDA1-7.
OK.
I insist on the point, because the MGA is about driving an
inconsistency between computational and physical supervenience, which
requires care and rigour to demonstrate, not careless mislabelling.
If you agree with the consequences from UDA1-7, then You don't need
step 8 (MGA) to understand the epistemological inconsistency between
of computational supervenience and the primitive-physical
supervenience (assumed often implicitly by the Aristotelians).
So, i see where your problem comes from, you might believe that step 8
shows that physical supervenience is wrong (not just the primitive
one). But that is astonishing, because the that physical supervenience
seems to me to be contained in the definition of comp, which refers to
a doctor with a physical body, which will reinstalled my "mind" in a
digital and physical machine.
Step 8 just shows an epistemological contradiction between comp and
primitive or physicalist notion of matter.
The contradiction is epistemological. It dissociate what we observed
from that primitive matter. Unless you introduce a magic clairvoyance
ability to Olympia (feeling the inactive Klara nearby).
Whether (3) preserving consciousness is absurd or not (and I agree
with Russell that's to much of a stretch of intuition to judge);
There is no stretch of intuition, the MGA shows that you need to put
magic in the primitive matter to make it playing a role in the
consciousness of physical events.
Where does the MGA show this? I don't believe you use the word "magic"
in any of your papers on the MGA.
Good point (if true, not the time to verify, but it seems the idea is
there). I will use "magic" in some next publication. At some point,
when we apply logic to reality, we have to invoke the magic, as with
magic, you can always suggest a theory is wrong. Earth is flat, it
just the photon who have very weird trajectories ...
I agree that I take for granted that in science we don't do any
ontological commitment, so there is no proof at all about reality.
Just that comp1 -> comp2, that is physics, assuming comp1, is not the
fundamental science, as it makes consciousness supervening on all
computations in the sigma_1 reality, but with the FPI, not through
possible particular emulations, although they have to be justify above
the substitution level.
It was also clearly intended that primitive-physical supervenience
entails that the movie will supports the same consciousness experience
than the one supported by the boolean graph. Indeed the point of
Maudlin is that we can eliminate almost all physical activity why
keeping the counterfactual correctness (by the inert Klara)) making
the primitive-supervenience thesis (aristotelianism, physicalism) more
absurd.
Sorry, but this does seem a rhetorical comment.
Who would have thought that?
I think you might underestimate the easiness of step 8, which
addresses only person believing that there is a substantially real
*primitive* (that we have to assumed the existence as axioms in the
fundamental TOE) physical universe, and that it is the explanation of
why we exist, have mind and are conscious.
That consciousness supervenes on the physical that we might extract
from comp, that is indeed what would follow if the physical do what it
has to do: gives the "right" measure on the relative computational
histories.
It is for those who, like Peter Jones, perhaps Brent and Bruce, who
at step 7 say that the UD needs to be executed in a primitive physical
universe, (to get the measure problem) with the intent to save
physicalism.
If you get the UDA1-7 problem, the MGA makes no point. It only shows
that physicalism or matter per se does not provide a solution (without
adding non Turing emulable and non FPI recoverable magic).
Bruno
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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