On 14 May 2015, at 20:22, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/14/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2015, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 02:33:06PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
3. A recording of (2) supra being played back.
Nobody would call that a computation, except to evade comp's
consequences.
I do, because it is a computation, albeit a rather trivial one.
Yes, like a rock, in some theory of rock. It is not relevant for
the argument.
It is
not to evade comp's consequences, however, which I already accept
from
UDA1-7.
OK.
I insist on the point, because the MGA is about driving an
inconsistency between computational and physical supervenience,
which
requires care and rigour to demonstrate, not careless mislabelling.
If you agree with the consequences from UDA1-7, then You don't need
step 8 (MGA) to understand the epistemological inconsistency
between of computational supervenience and the primitive-physical
supervenience (assumed often implicitly by the Aristotelians).
So, i see where your problem comes from, you might believe that
step 8 shows that physical supervenience is wrong (not just the
primitive one). But that is astonishing, because the that physical
supervenience seems to me to be contained in the definition of
comp, which refers to a doctor with a physical body, which will
reinstalled my "mind" in a digital and physical machine.
Step 8 just shows an epistemological contradiction between comp and
primitive or physicalist notion of matter.
How can it do that when it never mentions a "physicalist notion of
matter". It only invokes ordinary experience and ideas of matter -
without assuming anything about whether they are fundamental?
The contradiction is epistemological. It dissociate what we
observed from that primitive matter. Unless you introduce a magic
clairvoyance ability to Olympia (feeling the inactive Klara nearby).
Whether (3) preserving consciousness is absurd or not (and I agree
with Russell that's to much of a stretch of intuition to judge);
There is no stretch of intuition, the MGA shows that you need to
put
magic in the primitive matter to make it playing a role in the
consciousness of physical events.
Where does the MGA show this? I don't believe you use the word
"magic"
in any of your papers on the MGA.
Good point (if true, not the time to verify, but it seems the idea
is there). I will use "magic" in some next publication. At some
point, when we apply logic to reality, we have to invoke the magic,
as with magic, you can always suggest a theory is wrong. Earth is
flat, it just the photon who have very weird trajectories ...
I agree that I take for granted that in science we don't do any
ontological commitment, so there is no proof at all about reality.
Then why do you say that supervenience of consciousness on physics
has something to do with assuming physics is based on ur-stuff?
Just that comp1 -> comp2, that is physics, assuming comp1, is not
the fundamental science, as it makes consciousness supervening on
all computations in the sigma_1 reality, but with the FPI, not
through possible particular emulations, although they have to be
justify above the substitution level.
It was also clearly intended that primitive-physical supervenience
entails that the movie will supports the same consciousness
experience than the one supported by the boolean graph. Indeed the
point of Maudlin is that we can eliminate almost all physical
activity why keeping the counterfactual correctness (by the inert
Klara)) making the primitive-supervenience thesis (aristotelianism,
physicalism) more absurd.
Sorry, but this does seem a rhetorical comment.
Who would have thought that?
I think you might underestimate the easiness of step 8, which
addresses only person believing that there is a substantially real
*primitive* (that we have to assumed the existence as axioms in the
fundamental TOE) physical universe, and that it is the explanation
of why we exist, have mind and are conscious.
That consciousness supervenes on the physical that we might extract
from comp, that is indeed what would follow if the physical do what
it has to do: gives the "right" measure on the relative
computational histories.
It is for those who, like Peter Jones, perhaps Brent and Bruce, who
at step 7 say that the UD needs to be executed in a primitive
physical universe, (to get the measure problem) with the intent to
save physicalism.
I don't see anything in the MGA that makes it specific to a
*primitive* physics. It just refers to ordinary physical
realizations of computations, and so whatever it concludes applies
to ordinary physics. And ordinary physics doesn't depend on some
assumption of primitive materialism - as evidenced by physicist like
Wheeler and Tegmark who speculate about what makes the equations work.
There is no problem with ordinary physics. This should be clear given
that I show how com is testable by such means.
Now, if you already agreed that computationalism makes the physical
emerging from arithmetic, then you don't need to study UDA, just AUDA.
Bruno
Brent
If you get the UDA1-7 problem, the MGA makes no point. It only
shows that physicalism or matter per se does not provide a solution
(without adding non Turing emulable and non FPI recoverable magic).
Bruno
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