LizR wrote:
On 11 May 2015 at 19:14, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
But if the notion of physical supervenience cannot be ruled out,
then the way is open for primitive physicality. The comp argument,
which claims that the appearance of the physical can be extracted
from the UD running in Platonia, has no greater claim to credence
than the physicalist's claim that mathematics is a human invention,
extracted from our experience of the physical world.
The choice is actually between whether a recording can instantiate
computation and hence consciousness, or not (assuming, as usual during
this discussion, that consciousness exists and is Turing emulable, which
I believe means it doesn't contain oracles, hypercomputers, etc). If a
recording can instantiate consciousness then physical supervenience, far
from failing, is in fact strengthened, in that consciousness can
supervene on more things than we imagined it could.
Yes, that seems to be what would be implied.
The choice between these might reduce to nothing more than personal
preference.
Yes, although ISTM that a recording doesn't perform a general-purpose
computation, but only - at most - a specific one. But given determinism,
I'm not sure whether that matters or not.
The fact that projecting the film isn't a general purpose computer seems
to me to be a red herring. It was never claimed that projecting the film
of the brain substrate instantiated general consciousness -- the only
claim ever made here is that this projection recreates the conscious
moment that was originally filmed. That is all that is required. General
purpose computing and counterfactual correctness are all beside the
point. If the original conscious moment is recreated, then the film is a
computation in any sense that is necessary to produce a conscious
moment. This is sufficient to undermine the claim that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical body.
The matter of whether the physical is primitive or not is also a red
herring. No such assumption is required in order to show that the MGA
fails to prove its point.
Bruce
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