On 5/14/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2015, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 02:33:06PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
3. A recording of (2) supra being played back.
Nobody would call that a computation, except to evade comp's
consequences.
I do, because it is a computation, albeit a rather trivial one.
Yes, like a rock, in some theory of rock. It is not relevant for the argument.
It is
not to evade comp's consequences, however, which I already accept from
UDA1-7.
OK.
I insist on the point, because the MGA is about driving an
inconsistency between computational and physical supervenience, which
requires care and rigour to demonstrate, not careless mislabelling.
If you agree with the consequences from UDA1-7, then You don't need step 8 (MGA) to
understand the epistemological inconsistency between of computational supervenience and
the primitive-physical supervenience (assumed often implicitly by the Aristotelians).
So, i see where your problem comes from, you might believe that step 8 shows that
physical supervenience is wrong (not just the primitive one). But that is astonishing,
because the that physical supervenience seems to me to be contained in the definition of
comp, which refers to a doctor with a physical body, which will reinstalled my "mind" in
a digital and physical machine.
Step 8 just shows an epistemological contradiction between comp and primitive or
physicalist notion of matter.
How can it do that when it never mentions a "physicalist notion of matter". It only
invokes ordinary experience and ideas of matter - without assuming anything about whether
they are fundamental?
The contradiction is epistemological. It dissociate what we observed from that primitive
matter. Unless you introduce a magic clairvoyance ability to Olympia (feeling the
inactive Klara nearby).
Whether (3) preserving consciousness is absurd or not (and I agree
with Russell that's to much of a stretch of intuition to judge);
There is no stretch of intuition, the MGA shows that you need to put
magic in the primitive matter to make it playing a role in the
consciousness of physical events.
Where does the MGA show this? I don't believe you use the word "magic"
in any of your papers on the MGA.
Good point (if true, not the time to verify, but it seems the idea is there). I will use
"magic" in some next publication. At some point, when we apply logic to reality, we have
to invoke the magic, as with magic, you can always suggest a theory is wrong. Earth is
flat, it just the photon who have very weird trajectories ...
I agree that I take for granted that in science we don't do any ontological commitment,
so there is no proof at all about reality.
Then why do you say that supervenience of consciousness on physics has something to do
with assuming physics is based on ur-stuff?
Just that comp1 -> comp2, that is physics, assuming comp1, is not the fundamental
science, as it makes consciousness supervening on all computations in the sigma_1
reality, but with the FPI, not through possible particular emulations, although they
have to be justify above the substitution level.
It was also clearly intended that primitive-physical supervenience entails that the
movie will supports the same consciousness experience than the one supported by the
boolean graph. Indeed the point of Maudlin is that we can eliminate almost all physical
activity why keeping the counterfactual correctness (by the inert Klara)) making the
primitive-supervenience thesis (aristotelianism, physicalism) more absurd.
Sorry, but this does seem a rhetorical comment.
Who would have thought that?
I think you might underestimate the easiness of step 8, which addresses only person
believing that there is a substantially real *primitive* (that we have to assumed the
existence as axioms in the fundamental TOE) physical universe, and that it is the
explanation of why we exist, have mind and are conscious.
That consciousness supervenes on the physical that we might extract from comp, that is
indeed what would follow if the physical do what it has to do: gives the "right" measure
on the relative computational histories.
It is for those who, like Peter Jones, perhaps Brent and Bruce, who at step 7 say that
the UD needs to be executed in a primitive physical universe, (to get the measure
problem) with the intent to save physicalism.
I don't see anything in the MGA that makes it specific to a *primitive* physics. It just
refers to ordinary physical realizations of computations, and so whatever it concludes
applies to ordinary physics. And ordinary physics doesn't depend on some assumption of
primitive materialism - as evidenced by physicist like Wheeler and Tegmark who speculate
about what makes the equations work.
Brent
If you get the UDA1-7 problem, the MGA makes no point. It only shows that physicalism or
matter per se does not provide a solution (without adding non Turing emulable and non
FPI recoverable magic).
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
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