On 16 May 2015, at 06:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
But you could turn this around and pick some arbitrary sequence/
recording and say, "Well it would be the right program to be
conscious in SOME circumstance, therefore it's conscious."
I think it goes without saying that it is a recording of brain
activity of a conscious person -- not a film of your dog chasing a
ball. We have to assume a modicum of common sense.
Fine. But then what is it about the recording of the brain
activity of a conscious person that makes it conscious? Why is it
a property of just that sequence, when in general we would
attribute consciousness only to an entity that responded
intelligently/differently to different circumstances. We wouldn't
attribute consciousness based on just a short sequence of behavior
such as might be evinced by one of Disney's animitronics.
What is it about the brain activity of a conscious person that makes
him conscious? Whatever made the person conscious in the first
instance is what makes the recording recreate that conscious moment.
The point here is that consciousness supervenes on the brain
activity. This makes no ontological claims -- simply an
epistemological claim. This brain activity is associated with the
phenomenon we call consciousness.
Yes, but the relevant brain activity, assuming comp, is also emulated
(infinitely "often") in the sigma_1 reality. We can associate
consciousness to appearance of brain/computation, but we have to
associate infinities of brain/computation to consciousness. The
identity thesis in not one-one.
Bruno
How we determine whether a person is conscious in the first place is
a different matter.
Bruce
I think Bruno is right that it makes more sense to attribute
consciousness, like intelligence, to a program that can respond
differently and effectively to a wide range of inputs. And, maybe
unlike Bruno, I think intelligence and consciousness is only
possible relative to an environment, one with extent in time as
well as space.
Brent
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