On 26 May 2015, at 05:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/25/2015 5:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 08:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Part of my problem is that the UD does not execute any actual
program sequentially: after each step in a program it executes
the next step of the next program and so on, until it reaches
the first step of some program, at which point it loops back to
the start.
The UD does execute sequentially *each* specific program, but
the UD adds delays, due to its dovetailing duties, which we
already know (step 2) that it does not change the first person
experience of the entiuty supported by that execution.
So if the conscious moment is evinced by a logical sequence of
steps by the dovetailer, it does not correspond to any
particular program, but a rather arbitrary assortment of steps
from many programs.
?
Each execution of the programs is well individuated in the UD*.
You can descrbied them by sequences
phi_i^k(j) k = 0, 1, 2, ... (with i and j fixed).
But each step of the dovetailer is just a single application of
the axioms of the Turing machine in question: one of the
Kxy gives x,
Sxyz gives xz(yz),
for example. These single steps are all that there is in the
dovetailer. But such steps lack a context -- they make no sense on
their own. You could simply claim that the two basic steps are all
that is needed -- consciousness self-assembles by taking as many
of these in whatever order is needed.
If the next step of program phi_i is some 10^50 or so dovetailer
steps away, the only thing that could possibly link these is the
program phi_i itself -- the actual execution of the steps is
entirely secondary. In which case, one would say that
consciousness resides in the program phi_i itself - execution on
the dovetailer is not required. I do not think you would want to
go down this path, so you need something to give each step a
context, something to link the separate steps that are required
for consciousness.
The teleportation arguments of Steps 1-7 are insufficient for
this, since in that argument you are teleporting complete
conscious entities, not just single steps of the underlying program.
Of course, given that all programs are executed, this sequence
of steps does correspond to some program, somewhere, but not
necessarily any of the ones partially executed for generating
that conscious moment.
Yes. So what?
I was trying to give you a way out of the problems that I have
raised above. If you don't see that the sequential steps of the
actual dovetailer program give the required connectivity, then
what does? You did, some time ago, claim that the dovetailer steps
gave an effective time parameter for the system. But even that
requires a contextual link between the steps -- something that
would be given by the underlying stepping -- which is not the
stepping of each individual program phi_i.
I think what it boils down to is that steps in phi_{i}, where {i}
is a set indexing programs supporting a particular consciousness,
must be linked by representing consciousness of the same thing, the
same thought. But I think that requires some outside reference
whereby they can be about the same thing. So it is not enough to
just link the phi_{i} of the single consciousness, they must also
be linked to an environment. I think this part of what Pierz is
saying. He says the linkage cannot merge different physics, so
effectively the thread of computations instantiating Bruce's
consciousness imply the computation of a whole world (with physics)
for Bruce's consciousness to exist in.
My original question here concerned the connectivity in Platonia for
the computational steps of an individual consciousness. But I do
agree that we have to go beyond this because consciousness is
conscious of *something*, viz., an external world, so that has to be
part of the computation -- so that when I hit you hard on the head,
your self in Platonia loses consciousness. There is endless
connectivity between the self and the world external to the self --
and this covers all space and time, because my consciousness can be
changed by a CMB photon. Hence my thinking that the whole universe
(multiverse) may well have to be included in the same connected
simulation in Platonia.
Bruno does not seem to have thought along these lines.
I am not sure why you say this. I very often mention that possibility.
The point is only that whatever the case is, it has to be jusified
from computer science/arithmetic.
Bruno
Bruce
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