On 27 May 2015, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 02:06, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 23 May 2015, at 17:07, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 19 May 2015, at 15:53, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 19 May 2015 at 14:45, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
>
> wrote:
>>
>> On 19 May 2015 at 11:02, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
The consciousness (if there is one) is the consciousness of the
person, incarnated in the program. It is not the consciousness of
the low level processor, no more than the physicality which
supports the ant and the table.
Again, with comp there is never any problem with all of this. The
consciousness is an immaterial attribute of an immaterial program/
machine's soul, which is defined exclusively by a class of true
number relations.
While I can see certain very complex number relations leading to a
human-level consciousness, I don't find that kind of complexity
present in the relations defining a lookup table. Especially
because any meaning or interpretation of the output depends on the
person querying it, there's no self-contained understanding of the
program's own output.
Why? When you get the output, you need to re-entry it, and ask the
look-up table again. It will works only because we suppose armies
of daemon having already done the computations.
Determining the answers the first time might require computations
that lead to consciousness, but later invocations of the stored
memory in the lookup table doesn't lead to those original
computations being performed again. It is just a memory access.
No, because you agree that the system remains counterfactually
correct, so it is not just a memory access, there is a conditional
which is satisfied by the process, and indeed, if the loop-up table
is miniaturized and put in the brain, with an army of super-fast
little daemons managing it in "real time", the person will pass the
infinite Turing test, so, why not bet (correctly here by
construction) that it manifests the correct platonic person?
Again, it just mean that only person are conscious, not processes,
nor computations, programs, machines, or anything 3p describable.
That is what is given with the "& p" hypostases. They describe the
logic of something not nameable by the machine itself, but which
directly concerns the machine selves, and its consistent extensions.
The person is defined by its truth and beliefs and relation in
between truth and beliefs, from the different person points of view
(defined in the Theaetetus' manner ([]p, []p & p, etc.).
Bruno
But are not computations something different beyond mere inputs and
outputs of functions?
Yes.
It is like Putnam's objection to functionalism: there are multiple
ways of realizing each function, and they are not necessarily
equivalent. I think once one admits that the inputs and outputs are
not all that matters, this leads to abandoning functionalism for
computationalism, which also necessitates the concept of a
substitution level.
OK. But Putnam's original functionalism was just fuzzy on this. It
assumes some high level of substitution, around the neurons. It is not
the high level function of the person seen from outside (that would be
behaviorism).
Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above
the probable necessary substation level. (Despite having the same
inputs/outputs at the higher levels).
I thought so. But then we agree. It is just that if they have the same
input-output, for a long period of time, it means that the subst level
is plausibly correct.
We might have to define formally "look-up table". My attempt to do so
led me to redefine the notion of Turing machine.
Bruno
Jason
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