Are we any less conscious of as it happens, or perhaps our brains are simply not forming as many memories of usual/uneventful tasks.
Jason On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:06 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, because > all sorts of contingent things can be going on (e.g. dynamics of driving > among other cars), yet this occurs without crossing the threshold of > consciousness. Relying on some kind of caching mechanism under such > circumstances would quickly fail one way or another. > > Terren > On May 27, 2015 7:38 PM, "Pierz" <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Thursday, May 28, 2015 at 6:06:22 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 5/26/2015 10:31 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above the >>>> probable necessary substation level. (Despite having the same >>>> inputs/outputs at the higher levels). >>>> >>>> But your memoization example still makes a good point - namely that >>> some computations can be bypassed in favour of recordings, yet presumably >>> this doesn't lead to fading qualia. We don't need anything as silly as a >>> gigantic lookup table of all possible responses. We only need to >>> acknowledge that we can store the results of recordings of computations >>> we've already completed, and that this should not result in any strange >>> degradation of consciousness. >>> >>> >>> Isn't that what allows me to drive home from work without being >>> conscious of it? >>> >> >> People keep making this point, which is one that I myself made in the >> past - and I believe you argued with me at the time, saying that it's not >> clear that the mechanism for automating brain functions is anything like >> the same as caching the results of a computation. I think that objection is >> actually fair enough. With automated actions it's not clear that the >> computations aren't being carried out any more, just that they no longer >> require conscious attention because the neuronal pathways for those >> computations have become sufficiently reinforced that they no longer >> require concentration. I think this model (automated computation rather >> than cached computation) fits our experience of this phenomenon. Sometimes >> I suspect we're really talking out of our proverbial arses with these >> speculations as we still have so little idea about how the brain works. It >> may be a computer in the sense that it is Turing emulable, but then we talk >> as if it were squishy laptop or something, and that analogy can be >> misleading in many ways. For example, our memories are nothing like RAM. >> They are distributed like a hologram, constructive and fuzzy, whereas >> computer memory is localised, passive and accurate to the bit. I'm probably >> guilty of the same over-zealous computationalism with my lookup table >> analogy above, but I was thinking more of an AI and the in-principle point >> that cached computation results may be employed at a fine grained level. I >> would continue to insist that it is meaningless to say that a "brain" that >> employs cached results of computations is a zombie to the extent that it >> does so, because it is meaningless to speak of the "when" of qualia. (You >> never replied to my argument about poking a recorded Einstein with a stick, >> which I think makes a compelling case for this.) We have to rigorously >> divide the subjective and the objective. >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
