On 15 Jun 2015, at 05:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 June 2015 at 14:19, Russell Standish <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
It is plausible that regularities are a required feature of
conscious existence
This seems very likely, but it does assume something like a string
landscape in which some regions don't contain regularities. Or to
put it another way, regions in which maths doesn't work. This seems
to be out-Tegmarking Tegmark, who assumes that at least maths is
(meta-) universal.
At this stage, it's no worse than assuming meaning generation is a
necessary feature of existence, and that this can only take
place by
compression of regularities, which is the Solomonoff type
answer...
That would require a source of such regularities, surely? But that
would seem to lead straight back to requiring that maths works.
However, neither does Bruno's theory does not offer any explanation
for the 'uniformity of nature'.
I do much worst. I show that if we assume the brain to be Turing
emulable forces us to derive the uniformity of nature from the
uniformity of arithmetic, in some limiting sense (by the FPI, that is
the ignorance on which infinities of Universal numbers support "us").
I explain the problem. I agree that the proble is so huge that it can
look like a refuctation of comp, and that is why I translate the
problem in the lnguage of a machine, and study what is the machine's
answer, and it shows that the technical constraints of incompleteness
solve the problem at the propositional level, so well, physics does
not disappear, and comp is still consistent. But the problem remains
of course, and it is not a problem, it is a sequence of problems for
all computationalist theologians of the future.
He has to appeal to religion to magic away the 'white rabbits'.
Of course not. That is very unfair, as the very idea is to not use
magic at any point, just elementary arithmetic. remember that there is
not one thing I say, which is not provable in RA, PA or ZF.
According to Bruno's account, the physical world is not even Turing
emulable
I did not say that. The physical world can be Turing emulable, and
that would be the case if my generalized brain is the entire physical
universe. But this is an extreme case, and a priori, the physical
world is not entirely Turing emulable.
-- which one would think would be a requirement for regularities
that could be described by physical laws. (If the physical laws are
not computable, in what sense could one describe them as laws?)
I will have to go, but computable = sigma_1. many lawful relation in
arithmetic are not computable, they are just more complex. I can give
examples later, but, well, You need to study what is computable (in
the mathematical Church Turing sense. mathematics, even just
arithmetic, is mostly inhabited by non computable relations.
Intuitionist throw them away, but never completely, because they don't
want loosing completely the Turing completeness of their theories. The
universal numbers are the main roots of all the non computability
occurring in arithmetic.
Recursion theory, computability theory, is notably the study of the
degree of non-computability, or unsolvability. It is not just chaos,
the complex non computable things have a lot of order too.
Then you have the statistics, which can also manage some non
computable predictions in highly structured way, and QM illustrates
this (with or without collapse).
Bruno
Bruce
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