On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 4:44 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> > No. In Many Worlds both before and after the world splits the meaning > of the word "you" is the same, it refers to the one and only chunk of > matter that the laws of physics allow a third person observer, or even > allows Terren Suydam himself to observe, that is organized in a > Terrensuydamian way. But with duplicating chambers there could be billions > of things that the word "you" could refer to and they all could be easily > observed by anyone. So the question "what will you see after duplication?" > has no unique answer nor would there be any reason to expect it to because > "you" has been duplicated. > > At this point I'm going to ignore any points you make that depend on an objective observer's point of view, as I think we've covered all the ground here that's relevant to understanding or refuting step 3. > >> > >> You need to stay with the referent of the word "I" > > > I agree, so when describing the latest variation on the thought > experiment why not simply do away with personal pronouns like "I" and use > the referent instead? > > Because that's impossible. You yourself have made the point many times, in other threads, that we can never know for sure whether someone else is conscious. The referent of the word 'I' is accessible only to the subject. We cannot refer to someone else's first person experience as if from an objective observer's perspective. To really grasp Step 3 means to put yourself in the thought experiment and imagine what it will be like to go through the duplicator. > > >> The key to understanding step 3 and the first-person-indeterminacy is, >> well, the first-person. >> > > *THE* first-person has meaning in the present and so do personal > pronouns, by "present" I mean before you step into the duplicating chamber > or in Many Worlds before things split in two. But after that there is no > such thing as, *THE* first-person, there is only *A* first-person, and > that is true with both Many Worlds and duplicating chambers. But in both > can't I look back into the past and see a single chain of events leading > uniquely to me? Yes, but in both many worlds and duplicating chambers there > are other unique chains leading to "me". That's why the word "I" only has > meaning in the present by looking back to the past and never to the future. > But how can that be, in our everyday like we talk all the time about what > "I" will do tomorrow and it doesn't lead to logical absurdities, why is > that? Three reasons: > > 1) Our everyday world doesn't have duplicating chambers. > > 2) The Many Worlds idea might not be true (I have a hunch it is but I've > been wrong before). > > 3) Even if Many Worlds is true John Clark can pretend it is not and no > practical difficulties will follow because there is nothing that the the > laws allow John Clark to observe will contradict John Clark's claim of > exclusive ownership of the word "I". But if duplicating chambers exist the > word "I" causes enormous practical difficulties. > That's because you're still taking an objective observer's stance on the first person perspective. It makes sense to say THE first-person perspective even in duplication scenarios, because none of us has access to anything else but THE first person perspective. When you talk about *A* first-person perspective you go back to adopting the objective stance on it, as if any of us could access another being's first-person perspective, and this takes us away from productive conversation about Step 3. There is something it is like to go through a duplicator, and what it's like to be duplicated in a duplicator vs a many-worlds thought experiment is going to be the same because computationally speaking, those scenarios are equivalent. Brains are duplicated; at the moment they are duplicated they are identical; just after, they diverge. Those are the only details that matter from the first-person perspective (assuming computationalism) and both scenarios embody exactly that. > > >> > >> You need to stay with the referent of the word "I", >> > > As I said before, use that referent rather than "I" and that will happen > automatically, so why not just do it? Because then there would be no place > to hide sloppy thinking. > As I said before, that's impossible. "I" doesn't refer to a body - or if it does, only partially, and this is contingent, as it is conceivable (possible in principle) to be an "I" without a body (e.g. in uploading scenarios). > > >> a difference that disappears when you adopt the first-person perspective. >> > > Not just that but everything disappears > when > *THE* > first-person perspective > is adopted because when looking toward the future *THE* first person > perspective does not exist; things are unique when looking to the past not > toward the future. > If you were saying "yes, doctor" to save your life (even in the "yes, doctor" scenario I proposed that involves duplication), you would be betting that THE first-person perspective (as I've clarified earlier) would certainly have meaning in the future, or you would not say yes. If because of duplication concerns you would say No, then you believe computationalism is false and your real problem is step 0. Terren > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
