On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 3:50 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > >> Do you take the same position with regard to many-worlds style splitting >> experiments? >> > > No. > > Everett's Many Worlds > contains no ambiguity but Bruno's thought experiment > has nothing but ambiguity > . > In Many Worlds the word "you" causes no problems, if duplicating > chambers haven't been invented yet then "you" is the only chunk of matter > that the laws of physics allow John Clark to observe that are arranged in a > Terren > s > uydam > ian way. There is no ambiguity, everything is clear as a bell. B > ut in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of > the duplicating machine > who looks like > Terren Suydam > > and a > n > identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and > they both > passionately > insist that they are > Terren Suydam > and both > have a equal right to use the grand title "you". > > I'm not sure there's a difference there that makes a difference. In both cases: - the Terrensuydamian bodies are duplicated - the bodies and environments immediately diverge post-duplication - assuming computationalism, consciousness supervenes on the physical bodies - therefore two different first-person perspectives are generated post duplication - and both persons duplicated would claim to be Terren Suydam The only difference is that in the Many Worlds scenario, the two Terren Suydams have no possibility of interacting. Otherwise, everything else is the same. I don't see what problem the possibility for interaction, or not, poses on the question of "which continuation will I find myself in and with what probability?" Another difference is that Bruno and Everett are trying to explain > different things. Everett's Many Worlds Theory is trying to make > predictions and explain why they are probabilistic, and in that he was > successful. In contrast Bruno wants to cast insight on the nature of > consciousness, but predictions have nothing to do with the sense of > personal identity, not good predictions, not bad predictions, and not > probabilistic predictions. So Everett accomplished what he set out to do > but Bruno did not. > > Bruno's not talking about first-person-indeterminacy (FPI) as a means to explain personal identity. It's a key part of the explanation that computationalism implies that physics is not fundamental. That part comes later in the argument, so it's not worth getting into here. The point is that understanding the role of consciousness in Bruno's argument depends on understanding the FPI. It's a stepping stone to the more interesting parts of the argument. > > >> assuming the many-worlds interpretation, do you say that there is a 1/2 >> probability we will open the door and find a dead cat? > > > Yes because I know exactly what " > we will open the door > " means, it contains no ambiguity. I also know why you were the Dead Cat > Man and not the Live Cat Man, it's because you saw a dead cat. And again > the word "you" has no ambiguity. > > To be clear, it appears that the only defensible obstacle to your acceptance of step 3 appears to be your issues with personal pronouns. Given you accept the use of pronouns in the many worlds duplication, the problem must lie in the differences between those two scenarios. Terren > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
