On 03 Jul 2015, at 19:17, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> we have a billion times agree that John Clark is the guy
remembering that he is John Clark, of that he is the guy pushing the
button in Helsinki, and surviving in both city (in the 3-1-view).
If "he" means what you just said it does, somebody who
remembers pushing the button in Helsinki, then "he" survives in
both cities IN ANY VIEW!
In any 3p view, but certainly not in the 1p view itself. The guy who
open the door and see Moscow, knows at that time that he is the
exemplary of JC which has been reconstituted in Moscow. he is not (or
nor more, if you want) the guy who is reconstituted (perhaps) in the
other city.
Just do the thought experience. Imagine yourself before the
duplication, and making the list of the possible first-person
experiences which are available, when we assume computationalism, and
the default hypotheses. The experience of being in both city is NOT
available to any of the survivors. But easily available to "God" or
some enough rich notion of truth. The question is not on what is
avialblae to God, but to the person doing that experience. is it
I will die
I will see W and M simultaneously
I will see W
I will see M
I will see Vienna
I will see a city, but i don't know which one among W and M
There is no ambiguity, and only one correct answer above, once you
grasp that the question bears on the experience seen/felt by the
experiencer itself. The confirmation is given by asking the duplicated
persons (in this theoretical protocol).
If Bruno Marchal wants "he" to survive in just one city then that
two letter word will need to be redefined, although I don't see how
such word games would help in understanding how the world works.
I gave eventually 8 (if not 4 + 4*infinity) abstract definition of the
self-referential pronouns.
You need just to use those adequate in the context of what we are
proving about.
The first person are the person that we interview after the
experiences. We interviewed them all.
> you evade the answer, which is about THE unique city that the
guy in Helsinki will see after pushing the button. It can only be
either W, or M, and never both at once.
Why? If the guy who remembers pushing the button in Helsinki HAS
BEEN DUPLICATED then of course the guy who remembers pushing the
button in Helsinki can see 2 cities at once because that's what
"duplicated" means. And yeah yeah I know, I confuse the 1p with the
3p.
You do.
Somehow, you eliminate the first person experience. You forget that
once reconstituted, both see only one door, with only one city behind,
and with no clues which one it can be.
P(seeing one city) = 1, as "seeing one city" is the only private
mental experience available to all survivors, and the question was
about the expectation of that experience, from the experiencer(s)
points of view.
>> OK we need to do some heavy duty mathematics here. If "you"
saw Moscow (and the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man did see
Moscow) and if "you" saw Washington (and the guy who remembers being
the Helsinki Man did see Washington), then how many cities did "you"
see?
> One.
Ok I've learned something new today, contrary to my previous
belief I now know that 1+1=1.
When a person is duplicated (and survive qua computatio) there is a
sense to say that the first person is duplicated, but by the logic of
accessing only to private memory in some computer, it is easy to
figure out that both memories will describe a unique city, and unless
you believe that you die in the duplication, you know in advance that
the future experience available are among W and M, and are exclusive
as first person experience.
You are the one neglecting the important 1p/3p difference
systematically. By doing so, you are the one introducing the
ambiguities.
> the unique future 1-you is "W OR M"
I don't see what worms have to do with it.
That is funny. At least.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
