On 9 September 2015 at 02:40, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 9/8/2015 5:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-09-08 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: > >> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett < >>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude from >>>> the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or tails that >>>> the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one of which >>>> sees heads and the other tails? >>>> >>>> I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence for >>>> multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this data is >>>> that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there for >>>> any split of anything. >>>> >>> >>> It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split? >>> >>> >>> It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in order >>> to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of Occam's Razor, >>> no split happens. >>> >> >> So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if we >> lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are realised? >> >> No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all >> possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no >> uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the same >> thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in >> such a world. >> >> Either MWI is true, and all possibilities happen or it is not... so the > questions is, do you think that MWI is false, because probabilities seems > to means something in this world... because what I understand of what > you're saying, is that if MWI is true then probabilities should have no > meaning, but as you say they have meaning, then MWI is false... Is that > what you're implying ? > > > Bruce can answer for himself, but my view is that probability is just a > mathematical theory, like calculus or linear algebra. If there is > something that satisfies its axioms (to sufficient approximation) then we > can apply and use probability theory. MWI in it's meta-physical form > doesn't seem to satisfy the axioms. It doesn't have a borel set with a > measure. "Everything happens" isn't a borel set. > To ask the question differently, do you think the fact that probabilities are useful puts a constraint on possible cosmologies - Tegmark's various levels of multiverse, for example. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
