On Wednesday, 23 September 2015, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 24/09/2015 4:02 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 8:45 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 1:29 pm, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >> >>> I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with one >>> branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded "person >>> duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a duplication, two >>> new persons are created, so the probability that the original person will >>> see either heads or tails is precisely zero, because that person no longer >>> exists after the duplication. >>> >> >> So if some aliens create a copy of you in Andromeda, then you cease to >> exist as a person? >> >> >> Since I might know if they gathered the requisite information, it is not >> an issue. >> > > I don't see how this follows. Are you saying you would cease to exist as a > person if a duplicate of you arose far away in this universe, or that you > would not cease to exist as a person? > > > The closest continuer account of personal identity would have no > difficulty with this. The remote "copy" is purely a matter of chance, which > has no physical or causal connection with you, so is not a continuer in the > required sense. > You present "closest continuer theory" as if it is obviously correct, and it is not. In any case, even granting the theory, why should the causal or physical connection make a difference? I've sometimes encountered this claim in these discussions but it is just ad hoc. > Note: according to current comological models, space is infinite and >> uniform, which means infinite copies of you exist (though very far away). >> >> Such models make really quite strong assumptions about initial conditions. >> > > This all follows from thw concordance model of cosmology, which is the > "standard model" in cosmology. See: > http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf > > > >> You might well have an infinity of worlds with our present cosmology, but >> they might all be copies of some bland, boring model with no intelligent >> life. >> > > I don't think you grasp the implications of infinity. If there are > infinite worlds, there is effectively 100% probability that an infinite > number of them will be identical to this entire Earth as you see it. > > > As I said, that assumes some regular distribution over initial conditions > -- condition for which we have no evidence whatsoever. So our universe - > and our particular personal existences - might be unique, even in an > infinite universe. There can be universes of zero probability measure. > The Copernican Principle in conjunction with the observation that the universe is uniform in all directions is enough. > Pi has infinite digits. Any sequence, however long, the encoding of any > documentary, can be found in the digits of Pi, and moreover, it recurs an > infinite number of times. > > > That, too, is an unproved assumption about uniformity --essentially the > assumption that pi is a normal number. And that has never been proven. > > Bruce > > > I think you are trying to avoid answering my question. > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%[email protected]');> > . > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
