On 02 Oct 2015, at 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
According to computationalism, physics is found in the measure over computations that pass through the conscious state. If the way in which matter comes to be represented in that conscious state is irrelevant to computationalism, then computationalism abandons any claim to have relevance to physics.
No, it reduces physics to the statistic on those computations. At our substitution level, we might have long and deep computational histories, but that count for nothing if below the substitution level we don't get a continuum of possible histories, or some limit defined on it. The idea is that the physical is defined by the first person plural sharable (plausibly deep, perhaps infinitely deep) computational histories. Sharable among Turing universal machines, which plays the role of the basic "observer" in arithmetic. But that machine is unable to determined "one" computational histories, nor even to name herself from the first person point of view.
The Aristotelian assumption was a wonderful and fertile methodological simplification. But when taken too much seriously, it tends to eliminate the person, consciousness and conscience, which contradicts my data, and I am pretty sure, yours.
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