> On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:48 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 6/10/2015 11:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> On 6 Oct 2015, at 9:05 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> On 6/10/2015 12:29 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> On 5 October 2015 at 22:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>>> On 5/10/2015 7:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> On 5 October 2015 at 14:09, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> On 5/10/2015 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>>> On 5 Oct 2015, at 12:11 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So psychological continuation is very dependent on the exact details >>>>>>>>> of the case, and if copying of consciousness ever becomes possible, >>>>>>>>> then, by and large, it will simply be regarded as another way of >>>>>>>>> creating new people -- it will not be a recipe for immortality in any >>>>>>>>> except a very impoverished sense. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The example I was thinking of was destructive copying. This is >>>>>>>> equivalent to being knocked out and carried to another place. It >>>>>>>> doesn't matter how far or if there is a time delay, since you don't >>>>>>>> experience this. It also doesn't matter if there is a causal >>>>>>>> connection, as there would be in teleportation or being knocked out >>>>>>>> and carried, or if the copying occurs randomly. There is no way for >>>>>>>> you to know from introspection how you have come to wake up in a new >>>>>>>> place. >>>>>>> You might not then be able to tell by introspection whether you had >>>>>>> been destructively copied to a new location or simply carried there >>>>>>> while unconscious. >>>>>> >>>>>> That is exactly the point I have been trying to make. Further, you can't >>>>>> tell from introspection if you have been copied through exhaustive >>>>>> enumeration of all possible brain states 10^100 metres away or simply >>>>>> carried to the next room while unconscious. >>>>> I disagree. You certainly can tell that you have not been created by >>>>> chance 10^100 metres away because that would involve the transfer of >>>>> information over that distance, and that is not feasible in the time >>>>> spans we are considering. >>>> >>>> We have gone over this before: no transfer of information is needed if the >>>> copy is made by trying every possible configuration of atoms. Transfer of >>>> information is needed to verify that there is a copy and an original, but >>>> this makes no difference to the experience of the copy. >>> I think there is more involved than this. It is not a matter of experience. >>> If a purported copy of you arises at some remote time or place by random >>> chance, then there is no connection with your physical existence or >>> consciousness. A clearer situation arises if you argue that there are an >>> infinite number copies of you in the infinite type I multiverse. Each of >>> these 'copies' is a complete conscious person with his/er own personal >>> history. If you, here, die suddenly, then in so far as the copies are >>> identical, they will also die. And if they are only approximately >>> equivalent (so that they don't die), then they are not going to take too >>> kindly to your turning up suddenly and trying to usurp their brain, body >>> and consciousness! >> >> From this comment it seems that you have an odd idea of how a person >> survives from moment to moment, as if they have a soul that needs to be >> transferred from one body to the other. That isn't how it works. If A1 >> survives as a later entity A2, it is necessary and sufficient that A1 and A2 >> have certain physical and psychological properties. No spark or soul needs >> to jump from A1 to A2, and they neither need to have any matter in common >> nor do they need to have any physical continuity, since these factors have >> no effect on experience. > Yes, I am aware that this is a dualist notion. But I had the impression that > this was implied by what you said. > >>> These duplication scenarios make sense only if the remote person is >>> connected with you by transfer of information -- such as by send your >>> complete brain/body scan to the remote location and then re-assembling the >>> copy there. That might resurrect you, or make a viable copy, but no chance >>> configuration, or already existing remote person, is able to fulfill the >>> scenario you wish to paint. >> >> You state this, but you haven't answered how you would know or care if you >> had been duplicated in the incorrect (according to you) way. > I thought I had. If the purported duplicate has no possibility of physical > contact with you, then its existence or non-existence is of no consequence. > It cannot affect me in any way whatsoever. A local copy might or might not > resurrect you. Whether this is desirable depends on the details of the > physical instantiation.
You haven't explained what difference it would make if a copy could not interact with the original. What does it mean to say that its existence is of no consequence? The copy would still be subjectively the same either way. >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is why one needs independent external evidence to be sure about >>>>>>> what is going on. >>>>>> >>>>>> To be sure what is going on, yes, independent external evidence is >>>>>> needed. But it is not needed in order to be conscious. >>>>> But it is needed in order to be sure of what person you are. Self >>>>> deception is the most common form of deception, and only a fool would >>>>> rely solely on introspection for any important question. >>>> >>>> Information about any other copies is interesting but it has no bearing on >>>> your sense of continuity of consciousness. >>>>>> If personal copying is essentially unavailable in your experience, then >>>>>> you might believe that you had simply >>>>>> been carried somewhere while unconscious. If personal duplication were >>>>>> commonplace in your experience, you would require more evidence to tell >>>>>> what might have happened. In either case, introspection is a poor guide >>>>>> to the nature of reality. >>>>> >>>>> But introspection is an excellent guide to your thoughts and feelings. >>>>> But I am more than my thoughts and feelings. They are a poor guide to my >>>>> identity. they change far too rapidly and chaotically to be a reliable >>>>> guide to anything. >>>> >>>> Your identity is only your thoughts and feelings. Your brain, body and the >>>> environment are only relevant because they affect your thoughts and >>>> feelings. If you were uploaded to a simulation that preserved your >>>> thoughts and feelings you would not notice that anything unusual has >>>> happened, even though the substrate in which your mind resides has changed >>>> radically. >>> This, of course, is the heart of our disagreement. Your identity is a lot >>> more than your thoughts and feelings because those thoughts and feelings >>> only have meaning in a context. And it is your physical body and immediate >>> surrounds that provide that context. You might be right about uploading if >>> the uploading is into an environment that is not too dissimilar from the >>> current context of your body. However, if your sensory inputs change to any >>> marked extent, you will certainly be aware that something has happened. If >>> the changes are too drastic and inexplicable, you will quite probably go >>> mad. >> >> Obviously, the change in environment would only have this effect on you if >> it impacted on your psychology. The idea is that if you were copied, the >> difference between copy and original, including change in environmental >> inputs, is no greater than the sort of change you would survive in ordinary >> life. > > I don't think your psychology is all that independent of the physical > environment. That is what supervenience means. What I am saying is that the environment and the substrate is only significant to the extent that it affects psychology. A change in the environment that does not cause a psychological change is not significant in the examples we are considering. >>> I agree that the hardware of your brain, per se, is not important. But only >>> if one form of hardware simulates the other, essentially exactly. And if >>> the wider environment is largely reproduced. Consciousness supervenes on >>> the physical brain, and replacing the hardware does not alter this fact -- >>> your consciousness still supervenes on the physical substrate. It is not >>> independent of it as you wish to maintain. >> >> Leaving aside Bruno's argument that there is no primitive physical substrate >> on which consciousness supervenes, the point I am trying to make is that >> consciousness is not an immaterial substance that flits from body to body. >> If the physical substrate is reproduced in another place and time, the >> consciousness will be reproduced. The most efficient way of doing this is >> physical connection, but this is not necessary for psychological continuity. >> This is obvious from the meaning of the words "psychological continuity". > > I agree that duality is a bad idea. Local copies are one thing. Remote copies > with no possible connection are another. I do not know what it means to say > that such things reproduce the same consciousness. That is a claim that can > never be checked, and has no possible consequences. So Occam's razor comes > into play. Do you doubt that mental states can be duplicated by duplicating the physical configuration of a brain? Do you think the duplication would work if information is transmitted from original to copy but not if the copy was made without such information, even though the physical configurations are exactly the same? That would imply that two brains could be exactly the same physically but differ mentally, which contradicts the physical supervenience thesis. This would be a dualist position. > One trouble with the idea of copies of you in other parts of the multiverse > is that most such copies will not be identical -- they may pass through the > same conscious state at a particular moment, but because they are in > different environments, they will immediately diverge. The only sensible > interpretation of such a situation is that there are other independent beings > who are similar to you in some ways. That is the case anyway, and we do not > necessarily believe in panpsychism. If there are identical copies, then they > necessarily exist in identical environments, and anything that happens to you > will also happen to them. So they do not provide a means for your > consciousness to continue -- if you die, your identical copy also dies. Copies that start off identical diverging does not present a problem. There is a chance that you will experience any of the possible worlds branching from your present one, and if you die at one location you will only experience the worlds where copies of you survive. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
