> On 6 Oct 2015, at 9:54 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> On 10/5/2015 3:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> On 6/10/2015 12:29 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> On 5 October 2015 at 22:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> On 5/10/2015 7:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> On 5 October 2015 at 14:09, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> On 5/10/2015 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>> On 5 Oct 2015, at 12:11 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So psychological continuation is very dependent on the exact details >>>>>>>> of the case, and if copying of consciousness ever becomes possible, >>>>>>>> then, by and large, it will simply be regarded as another way of >>>>>>>> creating new people -- it will not be a recipe for immortality in any >>>>>>>> except a very impoverished sense. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The example I was thinking of was destructive copying. This is >>>>>>> equivalent to being knocked out and carried to another place. It >>>>>>> doesn't matter how far or if there is a time delay, since you don't >>>>>>> experience this. It also doesn't matter if there is a causal >>>>>>> connection, as there would be in teleportation or being knocked out and >>>>>>> carried, or if the copying occurs randomly. There is no way for you to >>>>>>> know from introspection how you >>>>>>> have come to wake up in a new place. >>>>>> You might not then be able to tell by introspection whether you had been >>>>>> destructively copied to a new location or simply carried there while >>>>>> unconscious. >>>>> >>>>> That is exactly the point I have been trying to make. Further, you can't >>>>> tell from introspection if you have been copied through exhaustive >>>>> enumeration of all possible brain states 10^100 metres away or simply >>>>> carried to the next room while unconscious. >>>> I disagree. You certainly can tell that you have not been created by >>>> chance 10^100 metres away because that would involve the transfer of >>>> information over that distance, and that is not feasible in the time spans >>>> we are considering. >>> >>> We have gone over this before: no transfer of information is needed if the >>> copy is made by trying every possible configuration of atoms. Transfer of >>> information is needed to verify that there is a copy and an original, but >>> this makes no difference to the experience of the copy. >> I think there is more involved than this. It is not a matter of experience. >> If a purported copy of you arises at some remote time or place by random >> chance, then there is no connection with your physical existence or >> consciousness. A clearer situation arises if you argue that there are an >> infinite number copies of you in the infinite type I multiverse. Each of >> these 'copies' is a complete conscious person with his/er own personal >> history. If you, here, die suddenly, then in so far as the copies are >> identical, they will also die. And if they are only approximately equivalent >> (so that they don't die), then they are not going to take too kindly to your >> turning up suddenly and trying to usurp their brain, body and consciousness! >> >> These duplication scenarios make sense only if the remote person is >> connected with you by transfer of information -- such as by send your >> complete brain/body scan to the remote location and then re-assembling the >> copy there. That might resurrect you, or make a viable copy, but no chance >> configuration, or already existing remote person, is able to fulfill the >> scenario you wish to paint. >>>>> >>>>>> That is why one needs independent external evidence to be sure about >>>>>> what is going on. >>>>> >>>>> To be sure what is going on, yes, independent external evidence is >>>>> needed. But it is not needed in order to be conscious. >>>> But it is needed in order to be sure of what person you are. Self >>>> deception is the most common form of deception, and only a fool would rely >>>> solely on introspection for any important question. >>> >>> Information about any other copies is interesting but it has no bearing on >>> your sense of continuity of consciousness. >>>>> If personal copying is essentially unavailable in your experience, then >>>>> you might believe that you had simply been carried somewhere while >>>>> unconscious. If personal duplication were >>>>> commonplace in your experience, you would require more evidence to tell >>>>> what might have happened. In either case, introspection is a poor guide >>>>> to the nature of reality. >>>> >>>> But introspection is an excellent guide to your thoughts and feelings. >>>> But I am more than my thoughts and feelings. They are a poor guide to my >>>> identity. they change far too rapidly and chaotically to be a reliable >>>> guide to anything. >>> >>> Your identity is only your thoughts and feelings. Your brain, body and the >>> environment are only relevant because they affect your thoughts and >>> feelings. If you were uploaded to a simulation that preserved your thoughts >>> and feelings you would not notice that anything unusual has happened, even >>> though the substrate in which your mind resides has changed radically. >> This, of course, is the heart of our disagreement. Your identity is a lot >> more than your thoughts and feelings because those thoughts and feelings >> only have meaning in a context. And it is your physical body and immediate >> surrounds that provide that context. You might be right about uploading if >> the uploading is into an environment that is not too dissimilar from the >> current context of your body. However, if your sensory inputs change to any >> marked extent, you will certainly be aware that something has happened. If >> the changes are too drastic and inexplicable, you will quite probably go mad. >> >> I agree that the hardware of your brain, per se, is not important. But only >> if one form of hardware simulates the other, essentially exactly. And if the >> wider environment is largely reproduced. Consciousness supervenes on the >> physical brain, and replacing the hardware does not alter this fact -- your >> consciousness still supervenes on the physical substrate. It is not >> independent of it as you wish to maintain. > > It's not clear to me who is arguing for what. Stathis may think that > consciousness is independent of it's physical substrate, but I don't see that > he's arguing that here. He's arguing that there can be more that one > instance of "the same" consciousness. But it's not clear what is meant by > "the same". Does one think of one's own consciousness as being the same as > it was a second ago? an hour? a year? twenty years? I think there must be > degrees of "sameness". Similarly, the degree will depend on the > environmental context and interaction. If you became completely immobilized > I think it would change your consciousness. Stephen Hawking is quite > different than he was 50yrs ago. If you had a chip implanted that allowed > you perceive the whole EM spectrum, including polarization, it might well > change your consciousness. Drugs and accidents change people's personality > and so, by inference, their consciousness. So does just plain learning. > > Is the question really about "Can we achieve immortality by copying to > different substrates?" As Bruce points out we would only preserve our "self" > exactly up to the last copy event, since we would have diverged from there. > It's like making a backup on your computer, it doesn't mean that nothing's > lost when it crashes.
Losing the part after the backup is equivalent to developing amnesia for this period. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
