On 03 Oct 2015, at 01:48, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/2/2015 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2015, at 21:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/1/2015 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2015, at 17:54, John Clark wrote:
> Many worlds is nothing more than a hypothetical
construct.
True.
Nice we all agree!
Note that one world is as much an hypothetical construct.
No, you can kick it and it kicks back.
That illustrates the existence of a physical reality, but that
cannot count as an argument for its uniqueness, nor for its
primitive or prior fundamental existence. On the contrary, QM and
computationalism can both be used to argue of the consistency of
either the 0 physical universes hypothesis (there would be only a
first person sharable "video game") or for the many worlds
hypothesis (like Everett, Dewitt, ...).
But the point is that there's ONE universe you can kick and feel it
kick back. That ONE is less a hypothetical construct than all those
others in MWI and eternal inflation.
That depends on the interpretation. Deustch would argue that today and
tomorrow are already parallel universe in the quantized space-time,
and if the theory is simpler with the many relative views, why not
taking it seriously.
Then in my dreams, I can also got the strong feeling that reality
kicks back. It is the type of things that universal number do: making
a person into believing. In video game like second-life, reality seems
also to kick back, where of course the normal gamer don't forget
completely the reality he started the game in, but even without the
formal confirmation, the fact that arithmetic contains all universal
games, makes me think that asserting the primariness of the physical
reality might be ... premature. Especially when that materialist
tradition is based on using authoritative arguments on the mind-body
problem, or eliminating the person.
Bruno
Brent
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