On 7 October 2015 at 07:51, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> From this comment it seems that you have an odd idea of how a person >>>>>> survives from moment to moment, as if they have a soul that needs to be >>>>>> transferred from one body to the other. That isn't how it works. If A1 >>>>>> survives as a later entity A2, it is necessary and sufficient that A1 and >>>>>> A2 have certain physical and psychological properties. No spark or soul >>>>>> needs to jump from A1 to A2, and they neither need to have any matter in >>>>>> common nor do they need to have any physical continuity, since these >>>>>> factors have no effect on experience. >>>>>> >>>>> I disagree with that last. It's commonly assumed, because with shut >>>>> our eyes and imagine scenes and we can compose dialog in our heads; but I >>>>> think it is a mistake to think these can happen independent of some >>>>> underlying physics - even if it's not "primitive" physics (whatever that >>>>> is) which Bruno dismisses. >>>>> >>>> But lack of physical continuity will not necessarily make a subjective >>>> difference, even if physics is needed to instantiate consciousness. >>>> >>> Not necessarily if it is at a very low level, e.g. atoms. But if it's >>> something noticeable, some difference in hormone levels, ... it will make a >>> difference in thoughts. If the thought sequence can different with the >>> things happening at the physical level of say neurons then it implies that >>> supervenience is false and the mental and physical can go their own way >>> (which is what we call "delusional"). >>> >> I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the >> normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding mental >> states m1-m2-m3 and s2 is omitted, there is nothing in m3 to give any >> indication of the discontinuity. Of course, normally s2 is necessary in >> order to generate s1, but that doesn't change the argument. >> > > But I think that's wrong. Brains are not like ideal von Neumann computers > or Turing machines that have "brain states" corresponding to "mental > states". If you simulated a brain using a computer you would find that an > enormous number of "brain states" were required to instantiate a single > conscious thought and furthermore the brains states necessary for one > thought overlapped with those necessary for the next thought. So this > overlap at the low level is part of the physical continuity needed for > consciousness. The fact that the physics can be simulated by discrete > computation doesn't imply that the conscious states are discrete. > If you simulated a brain on a computer and paused the computation for a while, would it make any difference to the consciousness generated? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
