> On 8 Oct 2015, at 4:36 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> On 10/7/2015 2:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >>> On 7 October 2015 at 17:09, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> On 10/6/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 7 October 2015 at 07:51, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>> On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> From this comment it seems that you have an odd idea of how a >>>>>>>>>> person survives from moment to moment, as if they have a soul that >>>>>>>>>> needs to be transferred from one body to the other. That isn't how >>>>>>>>>> it works. If A1 survives as a later entity A2, it is necessary and >>>>>>>>>> sufficient that A1 and A2 >>>>>>>>>> have certain physical and psychological properties. No spark or soul >>>>>>>>>> needs to jump from A1 to A2, and they neither need to have any >>>>>>>>>> matter in common nor do they need to have any physical continuity, >>>>>>>>>> since these factors have no effect on experience. >>>>>>>>> I disagree with that last. It's commonly assumed, because with shut >>>>>>>>> our eyes and imagine scenes and we can compose dialog in our heads; >>>>>>>>> but I think it is a mistake to think these can happen independent of >>>>>>>>> some underlying physics - even if it's not "primitive" physics >>>>>>>>> (whatever that is) which Bruno dismisses. >>>>>>>> But lack of physical continuity will not necessarily make a subjective >>>>>>>> difference, even if physics is needed to instantiate consciousness. >>>>>>> Not necessarily if it is at a very low level, e.g. atoms. But if it's >>>>>>> something noticeable, some difference in hormone levels, ... it will >>>>>>> make a difference in thoughts. If the thought sequence can different >>>>>>> with the things happening at the physical level of say neurons then it >>>>>>> implies that supervenience is false and the mental and physical can go >>>>>>> their own way (which is what we call "delusional"). >>>>>> I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the >>>>>> normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding mental >>>>>> states m1-m2-m3 and s2 is omitted, there is nothing in m3 to give any >>>>>> indication of the discontinuity. Of course, normally s2 is necessary in >>>>>> order to generate s1, but that doesn't change the argument. >>>>> >>>>> But I think that's wrong. Brains are not like ideal von Neumann >>>>> computers or Turing machines that have "brain states" >>>>> corresponding to "mental states". If you >>>>> simulated a brain using a computer you would find that an enormous >>>>> number of "brain states" were required to instantiate a single conscious >>>>> thought and furthermore the brains states necessary for one thought >>>>> overlapped with those necessary for the next thought. So this overlap >>>>> at the low level is part of the physical >>>>> continuity needed for consciousness. The fact that the physics can be >>>>> simulated by discrete computation doesn't imply that the conscious states >>>>> are discrete. >>>> >>>> If you simulated a brain on a computer and paused the computation for a >>>> while, would it make any difference to the consciousness generated? >>> >>> In an ideal computer, like a Turing machine, probably not. But that's >>> because the brain would have to be simulated on a much finer time scale >>> than that of conscious thoughts or experiences. The brain simulation >>> would have include simulation of neuronal signals in transit and >>> overlapping other signals with certain timing. >> >> >> If the brain is Turing emulable then the emulation can be run on a general >> purpose computer, such as the one I am using now, provided it has enough >> memory. I can at any point save to disk, shut down the computer, and come >> back to it at a later time. What happens as a result of the interruption? >> Nothing, I say, unless you break the supervenience thesis, since the program >> runs exactly the same. > > Yes, I said "probably not". I qualified it because the implicit assumption > is that conscious thought is supervening on the computer processes and so you > might wonder about what thoughts occur as registers are read off onto the > disk and later as they are reloaded. Those things are abstracted away in > ideal von Neuman computers, Turing machines and other mathematical > abstractions of computation. > > But aside from that, my original point was that mental states m1-m2-m3 are > instantiated by something like brain "states" > s1-s2-s3-....-s2345-s2346-s2347. And there's no sharp demarcation between > m1 and m2 in terms of the brain states.
Wouldn't that be the same for any complex process that is being simulated? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
