On 06 Oct 2015, at 22:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
From this comment it seems that you have an odd idea of how a
person survives from moment to moment, as if they have a soul
that needs to be transferred from one body to the other. That
isn't how it works. If A1 survives as a later entity A2, it is
necessary and sufficient that A1 and A2 have certain physical
and psychological properties. No spark or soul needs to jump
from A1 to A2, and they neither need to have any matter in
common nor do they need to have any physical continuity, since
these factors have no effect on experience.
I disagree with that last. It's commonly assumed, because with
shut our eyes and imagine scenes and we can compose dialog in
our heads; but I think it is a mistake to think these can happen
independent of some underlying physics - even if it's not
"primitive" physics (whatever that is) which Bruno dismisses.
But lack of physical continuity will not necessarily make a
subjective difference, even if physics is needed to instantiate
consciousness.
Not necessarily if it is at a very low level, e.g. atoms. But if
it's something noticeable, some difference in hormone levels, ...
it will make a difference in thoughts. If the thought sequence
can different with the things happening at the physical level of
say neurons then it implies that supervenience is false and the
mental and physical can go their own way (which is what we call
"delusional").
I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if
the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding
mental states m1-m2-m3 and s2 is omitted, there is nothing in m3 to
give any indication of the discontinuity. Of course, normally s2 is
necessary in order to generate s1, but that doesn't change the
argument.
But I think that's wrong. Brains are not like ideal von Neumann
computers or Turing machines that have "brain states" corresponding
to "mental states". If you simulated a brain using a computer you
would find that an enormous number of "brain states" were required
to instantiate a single conscious thought and furthermore the brains
states necessary for one thought overlapped with those necessary for
the next thought. So this overlap at the low level is part of the
physical continuity needed for consciousness.
But then you need to assume non-computationalisme, and consider
yourself as a non Turing elumable reality. OK, but that does not solve
the mind-body problem per se. It only introduce diffculties.
The fact that the physics can be simulated by discrete computation
doesn't imply that the conscious states are discrete.
The fact that consciousness state might be discrete implies that
physics cannot be simulated by discrete computation. Physics needs all
computations all at once to get the mathematically correct FPI.
Bruno
Brent
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