On 07 Oct 2015, at 09:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/10/2015 5:30 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 October 2015 at 16:54, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
It is possible that you might be able to make copies -- you
certainly can for AI. A copy means that information from the
original was used to construct the copy.
Where I use "copy" you might use a different word. Let's define
"doppelganger" as something which resembles the original
arbitrarily closely but was not constructed using information from
the original, while a "copy" is the same except constructed using
information from the original. Using these definitions, are you
saying that if you are replaced by a copy you will survive, whereas
if you are replaced by a doppelganger you will not?
I am saying, among other things, that you cannot establish that such
'doppelgangers' exist. Even if you had a purported doppelganger, you
could not establish that is was identical to you.
Theorizing on the basis of such doppelgangers is unsound.
Proof?
I think it is unsound only in your theory which assumes a physical
ontology and which models observers by actual infinite beings in that
ontology.
This makes the mind-body problem more complex; or trivial by
identifying a person with something so complex that we can no more
make any reasoning.
Let us try to solve the problem with simple hypotheses, and later, the
people can change the hypotheses if they don't like the consequences.
At least they will know why they have to change their mind.
My problem is only with people who claim to believe in both (weak)
materialism in physics and digital mechanism (in cognitive science).
Bruno
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
