On 14 Oct 2015, at 22:09, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/14/2015 8:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Oct 2015, at 06:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to
sustain consciousness.
Aaaahh... OK, but then you assume indeed, like Bruce Kellet that
computationalism is false.
Not at all, I only assume a brain needs an external world to be
aware of.
Either what you add to the brain is Turing emulable, and that means
you are just lmowering the substittution level, and the reasoning I
presented still follows (as he used the "generaluzed brain").
Or you assume a world made of some non Turing emulable primitive
matter, and this contradicts computationalism.
But then we are outside the scope of what I am deriving consequence
of.
(N, +) is not a group. That does not refute the theory of group.
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can
exist independent of an external world. It may be that physics
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that
self-evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it
must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do
that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then
physics must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is
true Jesus will return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.
Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.
The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate
all human behaviors.
First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.
But we don't even try to talk on facts. We do hypotheses and derive
conclusion.
You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.
You may make them doubt the premises or the rules of inference.
But, together with comp, the premise are of the type 2+2=4, and the
inference rule is modus ponens, (in the pure mathematical theory
extracted from comp). Which one are you doubting?
Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate
human behavior. If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may
still have to be physically realized, which means its finite,
which means the infinities of arithmetic are not necessary to
intelligence or consciousness.
yes, but by step 8, you need to add something non Turing emulable
to some Aristotelian Primary Matter, in which already the
physicists never assume when doing theoretical physics. And again
that would need computationalism being false.
I don't think step 8 proves that. My view is that computation to
instantiate consciousness needs a world, all the potential
counterfactuals, in order to exist.
(Sigma_1)-Arithmetic contains all counterfactual computations.
Then see above. You introduce something non Turing emulable on the
mind side: that is non-comp.
But that makes the conclusion of step 8 trivial; it reduces to a
computational realization of a world can include a computational
instantiation of consciousness of that world. Once it is expressed
that way the word "computational" is seen to otiose (just like
"primary matter" is otiose to physics).
So the world can be instantiated in arithmetic? Then we are back to
comp, and what we observe must be derived from all such "world"
executed below our substitution level.
A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can
have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-
Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.
But what do you mean by "computationalism"? Just that
consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a digital
computer? Or does "computationalism" imply all the inferences
Bruno argues for, but which are not commonly accepted.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno assumes
arithmetic is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about
what a system cannot prove about itself. But physics doesn't
need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go
to reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1
cannot be added to.
That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan
Mycielski. I think it's telling that you look at the mere
existence of alternative number theory as destroying "mathematics
as we know it". Mathematics is just a bunch of axiom/theorem
systems. There's no one really real mathematics any more than
there's one real language.
of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms,
Axioms only have hypothetical truth value. How can one doubt a
hypothetical?
By admitting it is hypothetical.
then I can't explain. But the comp theory uses much less "usual
assumption in math" than basically all theories in physics.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example
how is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the
multiple threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce
can speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is
possible.
Then machine can understand UDA and proves that physics does not
work for justifying the "strong" in "strong AI".
So what? You will deny the result by telling them, "oh, but you are
just a machine so it does not apply to me?".
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection
of computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and
#2 implies the right computations don't matter if they are
isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't
think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic
entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or
arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.
?
If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.
?? It will make sense as an axiom in a certain branch of mathematics.
Then it is no more the classical Church's thesis. It will be something
like intuitionist Church's thesis. That would again be just a change
of subject. It is like saying that 1 cloud + 1 cloud = 1 cloud can
refute 1+1=2. That is not good logic.
You will have difficulties in defining computable function from N
to N.
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can
no longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity.
Proving ~p is the same as proving p -> f.
Once a student told me "but I do believe in f". Ah? OK, but then I
can prove everything. "is that not nice?", no because I will give
you an f as notes, and you will have to try to convince that this
is good. Good luck with your parents.
Of course, when we apply this to reality, the f can be weakened in
any sufficiently absurd thing, like for me the idea that a
description of a computation computes, or "the mind is Turing
emulable except for the needed primary matter which plays no
observable role at all", or the mind supervenes in real time except
that it needs prior events, etc.
may be if you make your argument a bit more formal, we could see if
we do disagree on something. Got just the feeling that you want to
believe that computationalism is false. All i show is that
classical computationalism is testable, and that the non trivial
test are confirmed thanks to QM.
I think computationalism is probably true, if by computationalism
one means only that a robot can be conscious given the right
information processing. But I'm doubtful that it follows that the
material world can be dispensed with or that arithmetic exists the
way you and I exist or that a UD exists.
Arithmetic does not exist. But prime number, computation, and the
phenomenologies exists, in the usual mathematical sense, with the
modal nuances emerging from incompleteness.
The benefit? A rational account of both consciousness and physics,
and their relations.
The problem? Like Plato and the Mystics, the big picture is counter-
intuitive, but the intuitive view is entirely explained, though, by
the first person theory.
if you want to refute classical comp, just find any difference
between qX1*, say, and the empirical worlds.
I can kick things in the empirical world.
That argument has been refuted by the antic greeks and indians. The
person supported by the (generalized) brain in the vat can dream that
he can kick the dream world.
Bruno
Brent
I personally would be astonished that classical comp is true, but
without exhibiting the facts showing that, it is better to assumes
comp, as it is the simpler coherent account of both mind and matter
known today, and the big picture we get seems to be intuited by
those who meditate on those question like the neopythagoreans and
the neoplatonists.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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