On 14 Oct 2015, at 06:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible
to
make a computer that behaves like a human because there is non-
computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it
is possible to make a computer that behaves like a human but
not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness. But that is not
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
inferences Bruno claims it entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism
disagree." Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may
very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show
where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity.
The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.
"Presume" is the operative word there.
Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio
to prove computationalism is false.
So then what is his theory of mind?
Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.
Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that
it could be isolated from the outside world?
Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to
sustain consciousness.
Aaaahh... OK, but then you assume indeed, like Bruce Kellet that
computationalism is false.
But then we are outside the scope of what I am deriving consequence of.
(N, +) is not a group. That does not refute the theory of group.
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-
evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it must
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must
follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will
return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.
Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.
The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate
all human behaviors.
First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.
But we don't even try to talk on facts. We do hypotheses and derive
conclusion.
You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.
Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate
human behavior. If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may
still have to be physically realized, which means its finite, which
means the infinities of arithmetic are not necessary to intelligence
or consciousness.
yes, but by step 8, you need to add something non Turing emulable to
some Aristotelian Primary Matter, in which already the physicists
never assume when doing theoretical physics. And again that would need
computationalism being false.
A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have
no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing
Thesis gives you computationalism.
But what do you mean by "computationalism"? Just that consciousness
can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a digital computer? Or
does "computationalism" imply all the inferences Bruno argues for,
but which are not commonly accepted.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system
cannot prove about itself. But physics doesn't need infinities,
they are just calculational conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to
reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot
be added to.
That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan Mycielski.
I think it's telling that you look at the mere existence of
alternative number theory as destroying "mathematics as we know
it". Mathematics is just a bunch of axiom/theorem systems. There's
no one really real mathematics any more than there's one real
language.
of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms, then I can't explain.
But the comp theory uses much less "usual assumption in math" than
basically all theories in physics.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how
is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple
threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can
speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
Then machine can understand UDA and proves that physics does not work
for justifying the "strong" in "strong AI".
So what? You will deny the result by telling them, "oh, but you are
just a machine so it does not apply to me?".
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of
computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2
implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't
think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic
entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or
arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.
?
If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense. You
will have difficulties in defining computable function from N to N.
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity. Proving
~p is the same as proving p -> f.
Once a student told me "but I do believe in f". Ah? OK, but then I can
prove everything. "is that not nice?", no because I will give you an f
as notes, and you will have to try to convince that this is good. Good
luck with your parents.
Of course, when we apply this to reality, the f can be weakened in any
sufficiently absurd thing, like for me the idea that a description of
a computation computes, or "the mind is Turing emulable except for the
needed primary matter which plays no observable role at all", or the
mind supervenes in real time except that it needs prior events, etc.
may be if you make your argument a bit more formal, we could see if we
do disagree on something. Got just the feeling that you want to
believe that computationalism is false. All i show is that classical
computationalism is testable, and that the non trivial test are
confirmed thanks to QM.
The benefit? A rational account of both consciousness and physics, and
their relations.
The problem? Like Plato and the Mystics, the big picture is counter-
intuitive, but the intuitive view is entirely explained, though, by
the first person theory.
if you want to refute classical comp, just find any difference between
qX1*, say, and the empirical worlds.
I personally would be astonished that classical comp is true, but
without exhibiting the facts showing that, it is better to assumes
comp, as it is the simpler coherent account of both mind and matter
known today, and the big picture we get seems to be intuited by those
who meditate on those question like the neopythagoreans and the
neoplatonists.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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