On 14 Oct 2015, at 07:45, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.
John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness. But that is not
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
inferences
Bruno
claims it entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism
disagree." Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may
very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show
where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity.
The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.
"Presume" is the operative word there.
Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a
recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism.
And if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an
argument against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the
assumption of computationalism.
Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio
to prove computationalism is false.
So then what is his theory of mind?
Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.
Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that
it could be isolated from the outside world?
Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to
sustain consciousness.
Can you dream?
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-
evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it must
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must
follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will
return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.
Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.
Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward
multiple realizability,and therefore, against mind-brain identity
theory.
I think I guess your intuition here. But it is hard to convince Peter
Jones like argument with the mutiple realizabity, as they use their
ontological commitment in primary matter, and would say that whatever
realis-zability is used, it has to be built on the primary matter to
"create" consciousness. That is why I make the MGA, to show that this
does not follow, without making that primary matter having a non
turing emulable role in that generation of consciousness, which is a
way to say that comp is false, or true by magic.
They show that it is functional equivalence, rather than material/
compositional equivalence that matters. Since computers can realize
any finite function, then assuming there are no necessary infinities
within the brain, computers can realize any functional state the
brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be correct, you have to
believe either that functional states are irrelevant to
consciousness, or that physics can instantiate functional states
which Turing machines cannot.
OK.
The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate
all human behaviors.
First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.
It's as well accepted as any theory in physics.
Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate
human behavior.
It does. But you would say that it would result in a zombie.
If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may still have to be
physically realized,
The Church-Turing thesis says nothing about computers having to be
built out of electrons and quarks.
which means its finite, which means the infinities of arithmetic are
not necessary to intelligence or consciousness.
I don't think infinities are necessary to consciousness. It just so
happens that in arithmetical realism, there are infinite numbers of
platonically existing computations.
A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have
no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing
Thesis gives you computationalism.
But what do you mean by "computationalism"?
That the proper computation results in consciousness.
Just that consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a
digital computer? Or does "computationalism" imply all the
inferences Bruno argues for, but which are not commonly accepted.
My above insertion was that the "No zombie principal" + "Church-
Turing thesis = true" -> computationalism.
Interesting. I will think about that. It is of the type of "non
solipsism + comp" implies first person plural (which means that if I
am duplicated in the normal computations, you too".
The problem is that comp, strictly speaking allow quasi zombie.
Entities which looks like being conscious for a short time, and
"short" is hard to define.
It is the UDA which says computationalism -> the reversal. If the
UDA is correct, then transitively "No zombie principal" + "Church-
Turing thesis = true" -> the reversal.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system
cannot prove about itself. But physics doesn't need infinities,
they are just calculational conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme
length to go to reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to
which 1 cannot be added to.
That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan Mycielski.
I think it's telling that you look at the mere existence of
alternative number theory as destroying "mathematics as we know
it". Mathematics is just a bunch of axiom/theorem systems. There's
no one really real mathematics any more than there's one real
language.
Well then, if there are many mathematics, and they are all equally
valid (as you say), then we inhabit the ones that contain Universal
Dovetailers.
All mathematical theories agrees on the truth of the sigma_1 sentences
of arithmetic. If Turing complete, they prove the same behavior for
all machines. The sigma_1 truth is accepted by all mathematician
(except the ultrafinistic). Philosophical nuances begins on the
negation of the sigma_1. All universal dovetailing do the same in all
mathematical realities.
Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those who
claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which is not
used in the reasoning.
That is a subtle point rarely explained, but the book by Torkel
Franzen on "Inexhaustibility" makes a good try.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how
is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple
threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can
speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I
thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from
mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is
substrate dependent: that it depends on physically implemented
Turing machines.
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of
computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2
implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't
think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic
entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity
or arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.
Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
"A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
"A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
"A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"
None of the above items are true for physical approximations of
Turing machines. If these basic principals of computer science are
not true for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing
machines are they true for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or
does it concern itself with a recently-discovered mathematical
object for which these statements are true?
OK. Good question. Sometimes people refutes science with "bad
philosophy". Now, I agree that the FPI need the observers in believing
in (analytical) limits, but then a lot of physics assumes this too and
not always in the machine epistemology, like we can do with c.
That difficulty is unavoidable. By incompleteness no machine or theory
can define in its own language the semantic of that theory or of the
machine's beliefs. <>t is already religious, and indeed belongs to
G* \ G.
Bruno
Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
