On 15 Oct 2015, at 11:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 15/10/2015 6:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 15/10/2015 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those
who claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which
is not used in the reasoning.
An ontology *is* a philosophical commitment,
Not in metamathematics, nor in metaphysics or theology. An ontology
is given by the terms of the theory, which are supposed to be
realized in some model, at the meta-level.
In general, ontology is the science of being in general, embracing
such issues as the nature and the categorical structure of reality.
It is a specifically metaphysical term.
No problem, I agree. It is just that when we do metaphysics with the
scientific method, ontology is restricted to the interpretation of the
terms used in the theory, which is assumed.
I guess you are referring to the special use of the word 'ontology'
that is common in much scientific metaphysics: ontology refers to
the set of things whose existence is acknowledged by a particular
theory or system of thought. It is the sense in which one speaks of
'the' ontology of a theory, or of a metaphysical system. In brief,
it is the set of things that the theory or metaphysical system
claims actually 'exist'.
OK. Without meta-metaphysical interpretation of that "exist".
In this sense, one can reject the ontology of a theory, and this
would give one reason to doubt the applicability of that theory to
the real world. By "real world' I mean the world of common experience.
The idea is that we don't introduce any "ontology", just the axioms of
the theory.
Now, this discussion is hard, as the different people here are unclear
on their theory, and also, because in UDA I assume some informal
computationalism (Church's thesis + "yes doctor") which assumes
diverse things, like a local physical reality in which we can run
brain and computers, and consciousness, etc. Then in that informal
theory it is shown that the theory of everything (say) cannot be more
than a simple sigma_1 complete theory, like RA. Then the derivation of
both mind and matter and their relation is done in RA, by the
observers who have the right to believe in more than RA (they can
believe in the usual math used by logicians and physicians). This is
handled by the internal pov of the machine existing in RA.
Now I know that, like John Clark you do agree/believe/are-willing-to-
assume computationalism, which at the start is agnostic on both
Primitive Matter (physicalism) and God (or any other ontological
thing). So, if you don't like the conclusion you have just to find a
flaw in the reasoning. From you post, it looks like you agree with the
first seven steps, and have some problem with the step 8, but then you
must follow step 8 and say where you think an error is made.
Bruno
Bruce
even if 'everyone' agrees on it. If the ontology is part of the
reasoning, then it is opinion/philosophy, not logic.
Not at the meta-level. I agree this is not an easy point, but the
difficulties go away once you agree with the "final" theory, which
here is Robinson arithmetic. So you need, for the reasoning and its
conclusion to just *understand* 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... Then the
philosophical or ontological/metaphysical/theological commitment is
invoked only when you say "yes" to the doctor. Everyone can get the
consequences of comp, even those who does not believe in comp.
Bruno
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