On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote:


On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:



    On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote:
    OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought
    that has intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for
    the time being about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that
    consciousness supervenes on computation. This necesssarily
    implies (by Church thesis)  that the hardware doesn't matter.
    This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in which thought is
    instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering letters with
    symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. It's
    assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of
    complexity in order to become conscious, though what level of
    complexity is not specified. According to some views (Brent has
    expressed this position), it is necessary that the computations
    reference a "world", though I'll admit I don"t understand the
    rationale for that exactly. Important though is that it is
    neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some
    localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware".

    So my thinking is this: isn't /evolution/ precisely such a
    computation?

    I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of
finding ways to live and reproduce. Life on Earth is executing THE paradigmatic genetic algorithm.

Exactly.

    It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than
    any human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references
    a world". Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or
    the capacity for self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in
    relation to an evolutionary computation. Certainly it is a highly
    recursive procedure with a continual self-environment feedback
    loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently to say whether
    genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it. However
    I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely
    /self/- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia
    demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see
    that it is at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback
    system might possess  a kind of self-reference.

    Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus
    Church thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that
    evolution may be a conscious process - indeed the onus should be
    on us to say why it /wouldn't/ be conscious. Which does not mean
    I am suggesting some mystical additional ingredient. Evolution
    would still be described objectively in terms of random mutation
    plus environmental selection, but this process may have an
    interior component, its own "1P".

    Yes, I think that's right in a sense.  Life in a sense forms a
    representation of the world.   If a alien scientist were told just
    about the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal
    about the inorganic aspects of the planet.   I don't know if you
    could say it's self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves.  The
    problem is that it may be conscious in such a different way from
    humans or animals that it doesn't really add anything to our
    understanding of it to say it is conscious.  I've sometimes had a
    similar idea about the atmosphere and weather.  Isn't weather a
    kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it aware
    of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents
    and temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning
    fossil fuel,...

Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation? Isn't a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a matter of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation or not, e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take down a given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water on an actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the (ahem) slippery slope to panpsychism, which /I/ am happy enough with, but which I suspect to be too mystical for /your/ metabolism...

I don't see anything mystical about saying all those physical processes are computations, i.e. they are also information processes. Have you slipped over from computation to assuming they are conscious?

Brent

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