PA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms RA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic
2015-11-03 21:17 GMT+01:00 John Mikes <[email protected]>: > I read it all, did not find what PA and RA are standing for. > Can you explain in brief? > Thanks > John M > > On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> >> >> On 11/1/2015 11:09 PM, Pierz wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 6:25:57 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought that has >>>> intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for the time being >>>> about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that consciousness supervenes on >>>> computation. This necesssarily implies (by Church thesis) that the >>>> hardware doesn't matter. This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in >>>> which thought is instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering >>>> letters with symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. It's >>>> assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of complexity in >>>> order to become conscious, though what level of complexity is not >>>> specified. According to some views (Brent has expressed this position), it >>>> is necessary that the computations reference a "world", though I'll admit I >>>> don"t understand the rationale for that exactly. Important though is that >>>> it is neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some >>>> localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware". >>>> >>>> So my thinking is this: isn't *evolution* precisely such a >>>> computation? >>>> >>>> >>>> I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of >>>> finding ways to live and reproduce. Life on Earth is executing THE >>>> paradigmatic genetic algorithm. >>>> >>>> Exactly. >>> >>>> It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than any >>>> human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references a world". >>>> Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or the capacity for >>>> self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in relation to an evolutionary >>>> computation. Certainly it is a highly recursive procedure with a continual >>>> self-environment feedback loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently >>>> to say whether genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it. >>>> However I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely >>>> *self*- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia >>>> demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see that it is >>>> at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback system might possess a >>>> kind of self-reference. >>>> >>>> Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus Church >>>> thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that evolution may be a >>>> conscious process - indeed the onus should be on us to say why it >>>> *wouldn't* be conscious. Which does not mean I am suggesting some >>>> mystical additional ingredient. Evolution would still be described >>>> objectively in terms of random mutation plus environmental selection, but >>>> this process may have an interior component, its own "1P". >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I think that's right in a sense. Life in a sense forms a >>>> representation of the world. If a alien scientist were told just about >>>> the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal about the >>>> inorganic aspects of the planet. I don't know if you could say it's >>>> self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves. The problem is that it may >>>> be conscious in such a different way from humans or animals that it doesn't >>>> really add anything to our understanding of it to say it is conscious. >>>> I've sometimes had a similar idea about the atmosphere and weather. Isn't >>>> weather a kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it >>>> aware of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents and >>>> temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning fossil fuel,... >>>> >>>> Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation? >>> Isn't a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a >>> matter of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation >>> or not, e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take >>> down a given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water >>> on an actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the >>> (ahem) slippery slope to panpsychism, which *I* am happy enough with, >>> but which I suspect to be too mystical for *your* metabolism... >>> >>> >>> I don't see anything mystical about saying all those physical processes >>> are computations, i.e. they are also information processes. Have you >>> slipped over from computation to assuming they are conscious? >>> >> >> Computationalism is precisely that assumption (that computation equates >> to consciousness). >> >> >> No, it's the assumption that some particular computation instantiates >> consciousness. >> >> >> OK. >> Computation is a pure 3p notion. >> Consciousness is a pure 1p notion. >> Nothing can be more different. >> A computation just can makes it possible for a person to manifest its >> consciousness relatively to a universal number/environment. >> >> >> >> >> However, usually the assumption is also that a certain level of >> computational complexity must be reached before consciousness "kicks in". >> If as Bruno suggests, it's "all or nothing", then it's hard to see why the >> light should suddenly be switched on when a computation reaches some >> magical complexity threshold. >> >> >> It's my view that consciousness is realized by certain kinds of >> computation in interaction with an environment (which we call "the physical >> world"). It's not just a matter of complexity (the internet's plenty >> complex) or even "integrated information" (c.f. Scott Aaronson's blog on >> Tononi). I don't think we know exactly what it is, but I suspect it has to >> do with language and other representations of the world. I think that >> there are qualitatively different kinds of consciousness, not a continuum >> and not all-or-nothing. >> >> >> I agree, except that "all or nothing" is for the presence or absence of >> consciousness, a bit like a point of the complex plane is, or is not, in >> the Mandelbrot set, even if we can never be sure for a point which is very >> near the boundary (we zoom, and still don't know after 1 billions years, >> and have no idea how long it could take for the zoom to decide this). >> >> >> >> Of course one can argue that the internet is conscious or the weather >> is conscious or arithmetic is conscious - >> >> >> Only if we can name the entity, but "weather" or even "arithmetic" is >> fuzzy notion. To say that arithmetic is conscious is different than to say >> that RA is conscious, or PA is conscious, etc. >> >> >> >> >> but these depend adding the qualification "but not like my >> consciousness". >> >> >> >> RA is conscious like my consciousness after salvia (say) >> PA is conscious like you and me. Indeed, we are both PA, but >> reconstituted in different bodies with different memories. >> >> >> >> I think this is a cheap argument. We only know what consciousness is >> from introspective experience; so at least until we know how to produce and >> manipulate that we have no basis for extrapolating to other forms with >> which we have no experience. The kinds of consciousness I refer to are >> ones that we do experience at different times, e.g. awareness of without >> self-awareness. >> >> If it's more of a continuum then that does suggest panpsychism, though >> what the consciousness of simple processes is like is pretty hard to >> imagine. Panpsychism does still sound to me like a pretty big jump from the >> materialism we know and (some of us) love. A world of conscious information >> processes is not quite a world with soul, but perhaps also not so far from >> it. >> >> >> Now you not only project consciousness onto the world, but hope for >> immortality. >> >> >> Well, in machine's theology, the proof of the immortality of the soul by >> Socrates is valid, but is not constructive, and its practical aspect is >> dependent of you degree of appreciation of not knowing who you (first >> person are). >> Then, a priori computationalist immortality seems to be something more to >> fear than to hope, but both computer science and salvia can be reassuring >> by allowing possibilities of jumps between type of consciousness state (but >> *that* is still wishful thinking, as such jump are hard to relate with some >> type of death. >> Once a machine is above the Gödel-Löbian treshold, it has at each instant >> an infinite of futures, and near death or near catastrophes, it continues >> in the closer world consistent with its memory. If the subject identifies >> too much with its memory, the experience can be unpleasant. Some training >> in "let it go" can help, perhaps. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
