Thanks, Quentin, I take it as a reply to my questioning PA and RA. (the "A" in PA meaning axioms, in RA arithmetic?).
None of them satisfies my own take on 'intelligent'. I start from the llinguistic origin (Latin: inter-lego), I *READ between* - the lines and words, that is). To catch a 'meaning' (sense) more widely and accurately than a flat translation from a dictionary. Arithmetic is restricted IMO, I see no straight penetration into the emotional, feelable, artsy, thought-provoking, even freely anticipatory etc. by it's application (maybe, because I am no mathematician). Axioms I consider artificial rules made up to make (scientific?) conclusions valid. Maybe I am all wrong on this list. John Mikes On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 3:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > PA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms > RA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic > > 2015-11-03 21:17 GMT+01:00 John Mikes <[email protected]>: > >> I read it all, did not find what PA and RA are standing for. >> Can you explain in brief? >> Thanks >> John M >> >> On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/1/2015 11:09 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 6:25:57 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>> OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought that has >>>>> intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for the time being >>>>> about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that consciousness supervenes >>>>> on >>>>> computation. This necesssarily implies (by Church thesis) that the >>>>> hardware doesn't matter. This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in >>>>> which thought is instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering >>>>> letters with symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. >>>>> It's >>>>> assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of complexity >>>>> in >>>>> order to become conscious, though what level of complexity is not >>>>> specified. According to some views (Brent has expressed this position), it >>>>> is necessary that the computations reference a "world", though I'll admit >>>>> I >>>>> don"t understand the rationale for that exactly. Important though is that >>>>> it is neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some >>>>> localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware". >>>>> >>>>> So my thinking is this: isn't *evolution* precisely such a >>>>> computation? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of >>>>> finding ways to live and reproduce. Life on Earth is executing THE >>>>> paradigmatic genetic algorithm. >>>>> >>>>> Exactly. >>>> >>>>> It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than any >>>>> human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references a world". >>>>> Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or the capacity for >>>>> self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in relation to an evolutionary >>>>> computation. Certainly it is a highly recursive procedure with a continual >>>>> self-environment feedback loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently >>>>> to say whether genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it. >>>>> However I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely >>>>> *self*- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia >>>>> demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see that it is >>>>> at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback system might possess a >>>>> kind of self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus >>>>> Church thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that evolution may >>>>> be a conscious process - indeed the onus should be on us to say why it >>>>> *wouldn't* be conscious. Which does not mean I am suggesting some >>>>> mystical additional ingredient. Evolution would still be described >>>>> objectively in terms of random mutation plus environmental selection, but >>>>> this process may have an interior component, its own "1P". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think that's right in a sense. Life in a sense forms a >>>>> representation of the world. If a alien scientist were told just about >>>>> the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal about the >>>>> inorganic aspects of the planet. I don't know if you could say it's >>>>> self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves. The problem is that it may >>>>> be conscious in such a different way from humans or animals that it >>>>> doesn't >>>>> really add anything to our understanding of it to say it is conscious. >>>>> I've sometimes had a similar idea about the atmosphere and weather. Isn't >>>>> weather a kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it >>>>> aware of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents and >>>>> temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning fossil fuel,... >>>>> >>>>> Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation? >>>> Isn't a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a >>>> matter of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation >>>> or not, e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take >>>> down a given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water >>>> on an actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the >>>> (ahem) slippery slope to panpsychism, which *I* am happy enough with, >>>> but which I suspect to be too mystical for *your* metabolism... >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see anything mystical about saying all those physical processes >>>> are computations, i.e. they are also information processes. Have you >>>> slipped over from computation to assuming they are conscious? >>>> >>> >>> Computationalism is precisely that assumption (that computation equates >>> to consciousness). >>> >>> >>> No, it's the assumption that some particular computation instantiates >>> consciousness. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> Computation is a pure 3p notion. >>> Consciousness is a pure 1p notion. >>> Nothing can be more different. >>> A computation just can makes it possible for a person to manifest its >>> consciousness relatively to a universal number/environment. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> However, usually the assumption is also that a certain level of >>> computational complexity must be reached before consciousness "kicks in". >>> If as Bruno suggests, it's "all or nothing", then it's hard to see why the >>> light should suddenly be switched on when a computation reaches some >>> magical complexity threshold. >>> >>> >>> It's my view that consciousness is realized by certain kinds of >>> computation in interaction with an environment (which we call "the physical >>> world"). It's not just a matter of complexity (the internet's plenty >>> complex) or even "integrated information" (c.f. Scott Aaronson's blog on >>> Tononi). I don't think we know exactly what it is, but I suspect it has to >>> do with language and other representations of the world. I think that >>> there are qualitatively different kinds of consciousness, not a continuum >>> and not all-or-nothing. >>> >>> >>> I agree, except that "all or nothing" is for the presence or absence of >>> consciousness, a bit like a point of the complex plane is, or is not, in >>> the Mandelbrot set, even if we can never be sure for a point which is very >>> near the boundary (we zoom, and still don't know after 1 billions years, >>> and have no idea how long it could take for the zoom to decide this). >>> >>> >>> >>> Of course one can argue that the internet is conscious or the weather >>> is conscious or arithmetic is conscious - >>> >>> >>> Only if we can name the entity, but "weather" or even "arithmetic" is >>> fuzzy notion. To say that arithmetic is conscious is different than to say >>> that RA is conscious, or PA is conscious, etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> but these depend adding the qualification "but not like my >>> consciousness". >>> >>> >>> >>> RA is conscious like my consciousness after salvia (say) >>> PA is conscious like you and me. Indeed, we are both PA, but >>> reconstituted in different bodies with different memories. >>> >>> >>> >>> I think this is a cheap argument. We only know what consciousness is >>> from introspective experience; so at least until we know how to produce and >>> manipulate that we have no basis for extrapolating to other forms with >>> which we have no experience. The kinds of consciousness I refer to are >>> ones that we do experience at different times, e.g. awareness of without >>> self-awareness. >>> >>> If it's more of a continuum then that does suggest panpsychism, though >>> what the consciousness of simple processes is like is pretty hard to >>> imagine. Panpsychism does still sound to me like a pretty big jump from the >>> materialism we know and (some of us) love. A world of conscious information >>> processes is not quite a world with soul, but perhaps also not so far from >>> it. >>> >>> >>> Now you not only project consciousness onto the world, but hope for >>> immortality. >>> >>> >>> Well, in machine's theology, the proof of the immortality of the soul by >>> Socrates is valid, but is not constructive, and its practical aspect is >>> dependent of you degree of appreciation of not knowing who you (first >>> person are). >>> Then, a priori computationalist immortality seems to be something more >>> to fear than to hope, but both computer science and salvia can be >>> reassuring by allowing possibilities of jumps between type of consciousness >>> state (but *that* is still wishful thinking, as such jump are hard to >>> relate with some type of death. >>> Once a machine is above the Gödel-Löbian treshold, it has at each >>> instant an infinite of futures, and near death or near catastrophes, it >>> continues in the closer world consistent with its memory. If the subject >>> identifies too much with its memory, the experience can be unpleasant. Some >>> training in "let it go" can help, perhaps. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
