I read it all, did not find what PA and RA are standing for. Can you explain in brief? Thanks John M
On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 11/1/2015 11:09 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 6:25:57 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought that has >>> intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for the time being >>> about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that consciousness supervenes on >>> computation. This necesssarily implies (by Church thesis) that the >>> hardware doesn't matter. This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in >>> which thought is instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering >>> letters with symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. It's >>> assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of complexity in >>> order to become conscious, though what level of complexity is not >>> specified. According to some views (Brent has expressed this position), it >>> is necessary that the computations reference a "world", though I'll admit I >>> don"t understand the rationale for that exactly. Important though is that >>> it is neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some >>> localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware". >>> >>> So my thinking is this: isn't *evolution* precisely such a computation? >>> >>> >>> I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of finding >>> ways to live and reproduce. Life on Earth is executing THE paradigmatic >>> genetic algorithm. >>> >>> Exactly. >> >>> It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than any >>> human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references a world". >>> Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or the capacity for >>> self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in relation to an evolutionary >>> computation. Certainly it is a highly recursive procedure with a continual >>> self-environment feedback loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently >>> to say whether genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it. >>> However I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely >>> *self*- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia >>> demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see that it is >>> at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback system might possess a >>> kind of self-reference. >>> >>> Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus Church >>> thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that evolution may be a >>> conscious process - indeed the onus should be on us to say why it >>> *wouldn't* be conscious. Which does not mean I am suggesting some >>> mystical additional ingredient. Evolution would still be described >>> objectively in terms of random mutation plus environmental selection, but >>> this process may have an interior component, its own "1P". >>> >>> >>> Yes, I think that's right in a sense. Life in a sense forms a >>> representation of the world. If a alien scientist were told just about >>> the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal about the >>> inorganic aspects of the planet. I don't know if you could say it's >>> self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves. The problem is that it may >>> be conscious in such a different way from humans or animals that it doesn't >>> really add anything to our understanding of it to say it is conscious. >>> I've sometimes had a similar idea about the atmosphere and weather. Isn't >>> weather a kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it >>> aware of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents and >>> temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning fossil fuel,... >>> >>> Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation? Isn't >> a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a matter >> of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation or not, >> e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take down a >> given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water on an >> actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the (ahem) >> slippery slope to panpsychism, which *I* am happy enough with, but which >> I suspect to be too mystical for *your* metabolism... >> >> >> I don't see anything mystical about saying all those physical processes >> are computations, i.e. they are also information processes. Have you >> slipped over from computation to assuming they are conscious? >> > > Computationalism is precisely that assumption (that computation equates to > consciousness). > > > No, it's the assumption that some particular computation instantiates > consciousness. > > > OK. > Computation is a pure 3p notion. > Consciousness is a pure 1p notion. > Nothing can be more different. > A computation just can makes it possible for a person to manifest its > consciousness relatively to a universal number/environment. > > > > > However, usually the assumption is also that a certain level of > computational complexity must be reached before consciousness "kicks in". > If as Bruno suggests, it's "all or nothing", then it's hard to see why the > light should suddenly be switched on when a computation reaches some > magical complexity threshold. > > > It's my view that consciousness is realized by certain kinds of > computation in interaction with an environment (which we call "the physical > world"). It's not just a matter of complexity (the internet's plenty > complex) or even "integrated information" (c.f. Scott Aaronson's blog on > Tononi). I don't think we know exactly what it is, but I suspect it has to > do with language and other representations of the world. I think that > there are qualitatively different kinds of consciousness, not a continuum > and not all-or-nothing. > > > I agree, except that "all or nothing" is for the presence or absence of > consciousness, a bit like a point of the complex plane is, or is not, in > the Mandelbrot set, even if we can never be sure for a point which is very > near the boundary (we zoom, and still don't know after 1 billions years, > and have no idea how long it could take for the zoom to decide this). > > > > Of course one can argue that the internet is conscious or the weather is > conscious or arithmetic is conscious - > > > Only if we can name the entity, but "weather" or even "arithmetic" is > fuzzy notion. To say that arithmetic is conscious is different than to say > that RA is conscious, or PA is conscious, etc. > > > > > but these depend adding the qualification "but not like my > consciousness". > > > > RA is conscious like my consciousness after salvia (say) > PA is conscious like you and me. Indeed, we are both PA, but reconstituted > in different bodies with different memories. > > > > I think this is a cheap argument. We only know what consciousness is from > introspective experience; so at least until we know how to produce and > manipulate that we have no basis for extrapolating to other forms with > which we have no experience. The kinds of consciousness I refer to are > ones that we do experience at different times, e.g. awareness of without > self-awareness. > > If it's more of a continuum then that does suggest panpsychism, though > what the consciousness of simple processes is like is pretty hard to > imagine. Panpsychism does still sound to me like a pretty big jump from the > materialism we know and (some of us) love. A world of conscious information > processes is not quite a world with soul, but perhaps also not so far from > it. > > > Now you not only project consciousness onto the world, but hope for > immortality. > > > Well, in machine's theology, the proof of the immortality of the soul by > Socrates is valid, but is not constructive, and its practical aspect is > dependent of you degree of appreciation of not knowing who you (first > person are). > Then, a priori computationalist immortality seems to be something more to > fear than to hope, but both computer science and salvia can be reassuring > by allowing possibilities of jumps between type of consciousness state (but > *that* is still wishful thinking, as such jump are hard to relate with some > type of death. > Once a machine is above the Gödel-Löbian treshold, it has at each instant > an infinite of futures, and near death or near catastrophes, it continues > in the closer world consistent with its memory. If the subject identifies > too much with its memory, the experience can be unpleasant. Some training > in "let it go" can help, perhaps. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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