Hi Dan,

On 12 Dec 2015, at 12:00, Dan wrote:

Bruno, apologies for incorrect attribution and thank you for this insight.

No problem. My main point is that they are not aware that the brain- mind identity link does not work when we assume Digital Mechanism (that is, the thesis that my body is a machine, not necessarily that the Universe is a machine).


I will need time to understand "derive physics from a statistics on the natural number computable relations" as well as the shortcomings you illustrate regarding Tegmark and Schmidhuber; I'll begin by reading the SANE2004 paper.

Nice.


I happened to just now stumble upon "The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory" by Christopher Michael Langan and was wondering if you had ever reviewed it? http://www.ctmu.net/

I will take a look. It still seems Aristotelian (assuming a physical reality, which cannot really help to manage the mind-body relation; but this you should understand by reading the 8 steps arguments in the sane04 paper). He cites Wheeler who has good insight, despite he hesitate to really embrace Everett's understanding of QM). Note that my derivation does not assume anything primitively physical: it assumes only that there is a physical reality (not necessarily a primitive one, or an ontologically prior one) which is rich enough to be Turing universal (and thus rich enough to emulate universal computer in the original non physical sense of Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, ...).


Best,

Bruno



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