On 12/10/2015 9:30 PM, Dan wrote:
Alright, I'm going to try to piece things together and start by
backing up. The determination of whether matter, described by QM, has
a spectrum gap has recently been shown to be undecidable per the third
link in first post.
Maybe. Real lattices are not 2D. It hasn't been shown that the result
would extend to 3D.
This implies some aspect of physics is not computable, and therefore
the Strong Church Turing thesis and digital physics are invalidated.
It also implies that the reductionist hypothesis is invalid because
there will be explanatory gaps from the microscopic to the
macroscopic, and that emergence (sum is greater than parts) should be
elevated to a first-class component of nature.
The phi measure in IIT "will be high when there is a lot of
information generated among the parts of a system as opposed to within
them" and therefore can be by definition considered a measure of
emergence. Tononi/Koch claim it's a measure of consciousness, though
Koch is ironically a self-proclaimed "romantic reductionist." As
reductionism is invalidated, the sum-greater-than-parts measure phi by
Tononi/Koch corresponds to one hypercomputable aspect of nature;
Except that Aaronson has given an example of a system that has maximal
IIT but which nobody would suppose was conscious.
we say that to be hypercomputable or irreducable (i.e., to an
algorithm) is to be emergent (sum-greater-than-parts). However, the
interpretation of phi (a measure of emergence) as consciousness is
based on intuition. It has not been verified. If this association of
phi with consciousness could be verified, then we could safely assume
HHI hypothesis to be true, i.e. that consciousness is a
hypercomputable aspect of nature.
The argument by Maguire et al. starting with IIT (and also
corroborating HHI hypothesis) seems to agree with the recent indirect
proof that reductionism is invalid.
I'm not sure what you mean by reductionism is invalid? It's
reductionism that predicts the non-computability of the electron energy
gap in a 2D lattice. That some things are not predictable, even in
principle, was long accepted as an attribute of QM, but that didn't keep
anyone from using reductionist explanations.
However, it doesn't invalidate IIT as claimed because IIT implies
hypercomputability; the phi measure is a measure of emergence. If
consciousness is demonstrated to correlate with phi and thus proved to
be hypercomputable, Goertzel says we can still produce humanlike AI
with Turing machines by modeling imitation, intuition and chance.
Or we can build one with a (approximate) 2D lattice in it's computer.
Furthermore, If HHI is true, then any reductionist attempts to
describe consciousness like the OrchOR theory by Penrose/Hameroff are
doomed to fail because a hypercomputable (emergent) process, by
definition, cannot be described in any formal language (as Goertzel
points out in his paper).
?? People are writing formal languages for hypercomputation and proving
theorems about super-Turing computation. I expect that none can be
physically realized, but I might be wrong and either way there are
formal descriptions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation
Aaronson's zombie argument is just claiming that no scientific theory
could explain the first-person experience and solve the Hard Problem
of consciousness. He just observes it would be ridiculous if 'someone
claims that integrated information “explains” why consciousness
exists.' Notice that if consciousness is hypercomputable (correlates
with phi), then that is exactly what Goertzel concludes in his paper.
Aaronson even admits 'we can easily interpret IIT as trying to do
something more “modest” than solve the Hard Problem, although still
staggeringly audacious. Namely, we can say that IIT “merely” aims to
tell us which physical systems are associated with consciousness and
which aren’t, purely in terms of the systems’ physical organization.
The test of such a theory is whether it can produce results agreeing
with “commonsense intuition”
Except that it fails this test for the example Aaronson constructs.
Brent
: for example, whether it can affirm, from first principles, that
(most) humans are conscious; that dogs and horses are also conscious
but less so; that rocks, livers, bacteria colonies, and existing
digital computers are not conscious (or are hardly conscious); and
that a room full of people has no “mega-consciousness” over and above
the consciousnesses of the individuals.'
On Thursday, December 10, 2015 at 9:37:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
But see
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
<http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799>
Brent
On 12/10/2015 5:54 PM, Dan wrote:
I should mention this paper, which gives credence to HHI by
beginning with Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of
consciousness and, by assuming consciousness is a lossless
integrative process, concluding that it would not be computable.
* http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0126
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected] <javascript:>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<javascript:>.
Visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
<https://groups.google.com/d/optout>.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
