On 13 Jul 2016, at 00:23, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/12/2016 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jul 2016, at 20:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]
>
wrote:
Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
What you just said was:
"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to
win this
game is not to play it
"
And then I just said:
"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."
It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).
It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the
game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from
your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to
this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would
be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when
discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.
Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I
consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is
precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your
religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.
I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you
go:
"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion
that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the
ideas
of your interlocutor.
You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.
Rather accurate description I'm afraid.
I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
Materialism----which includes Weak Materialism: the belief in
some primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological
version: Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics
can't be reduced to anything else simpler).
I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the
use of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not
only matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists.
Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as
Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think,
but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on
the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist)
answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is
good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific
derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he
never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he
dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical
contingencies which might explain this.
Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and
still be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal
number + some oracle).
When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain
what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness,
and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for
consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they
can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations
(measure).
Explanation is easy. Prediction is hard. Physicalist can predict
that cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of
consciousness.
That is not 3p testable.
Sure it is, unless you deny that you have a reference for the word
"conscious" which you used freely above.
Only in the 1p mode, which cannot be used in the 3p scientific
discourse, unless we assume mechanism, in which case it is proven that
the physicalist is wrong (and that is testable, although in an
indirect way).
Anyway, I just show that Physicalism is incompatible with Mechanism
+ Occam.
Materialism needs to add a magic thing which has never been
obesrved by anyone (primary matter) or something even more magical
making the physical "reality" able to make "real" what already
exist from much less assumption.
There is no more "magic" than any other theory. Every theory posits
some ontology. You posit the integers - an infinite set which has
never been observed either and which ex hypothesi cannot be
observed. No physicist proposes "primary matter" they just write
descriptive equations which on the the basis of their predictive
power they think capture some truths about reality.
That is why there is no problem with physics and physicists.
Computationalism is a problem only with materialist (resp.
physicalist), which commit themselves in some ontological assumption
(primary matter) (resp. in some assumption assumed to be not
reductible to anything else).
But I decide nothing: I show that physicalism versus mechanism can
be tested.
Explanations in terms of infinities of computations are like
physics explaining things as "A consequence of the state of the
universe and the laws of physics."
I don't submit an explanation. I submit a problem for the Mechanist.
Then I show that the machines have, in some sense, already solved a
part of the problem (the propositional part) and this in a
sufficiently precise way so as to be tested.
By QM, things fit more with mechanism than physicalism up to now.
That's because computationalism doesn't predict anything specific.
The only things it is specific about are retrodictions.
It predicts the whole of physics, minus geography. Contingently, it
has only recovered a part of quantum logic, but it is a matter of work
to pursue the comparison. It would have predicted classical logic for
the observable, the empirical QM would have been an evidence against
computationalism.
But the goal of computationalism is not prediction per se. It is just
to get a coherent theory of mind (computer science, provability logic)
together with a coherent theory of matter.
In the frame of computationalism, physicalism is already refuted.
Empirically, we need to progress on the math of the "material
hypostases" and do the comparison, and refute either materialism or
digital mechanism.
Bruno
Brent
Of course in some Newtonian era we might have thought differently.
In science we never know the truth as such, but we can find more or
less plausible theories.
Bruno
Brent
Some people, when they learn that you are open to the idea that
(weak) materialism is wrong, will believe, for a time, that you
are actually open to the fairy tales, superstition and magic, and
so believe that you are mad. When they realize the error, and
that immaterialism can also be only some mathematicalism, which
usually assumes *less* than physicalism, it is too much
embarrassing for them to admit.
Then they hate you cordially when they eventually understand that
they were the one still using magic in their religion.
Bruno
Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
John K Clark
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