On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 15 Jul 2016, at 10:10, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes >>>>>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for illustrating what I just said. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What you just said was: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> " >>>>>>>> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> game is not to play it >>>>>>>> " >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And then I just said: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that >>>>>>>> Telmo Menezes >>>>>>>> is not sane." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane >>>>>>> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of >>>>>>> playing the game (sooner or later). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of >>>>>>> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your >>>>>>> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the >>>>>>> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus >>>>>>> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this >>>>>>> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited >>>>>>> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be >>>>>>> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing >>>>>>> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider >>>>>>> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely >>>>>>> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion >>>>>>> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never >>>>>>> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious >>>>>>> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that >>>>>>> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas >>>>>>> of your interlocutor. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score >>>>>>> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to >>>>>>> you. >>>>>>> >>>>>> Rather accurate description I'm afraid. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is >>>>>> Materialism----which includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some >>>>>> primary >>>>>> matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism >>>>>> (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to >>>>>> anything >>>>>> else simpler). >>>>>> >>>>>> I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of >>>>>> "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only >>>>>> matter/force >>>>>> exists, but only matter/force exists. >>>>>> >>>>>> Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot >>>>>> and >>>>>> the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to >>>>>> some >>>>>> point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I >>>>>> think >>>>>> Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he >>>>>> needs >>>>>> to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in >>>>>> a >>>>>> scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too >>>>>> bad >>>>>> he >>>>>> never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he >>>>>> dismissed >>>>>> logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which >>>>>> might >>>>>> explain this. >>>>>> >>>>>> Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be >>>>>> physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some >>>>>> oracle). >>>>>> >>>>>> When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what >>>>>> is >>>>>> primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up >>>>>> to >>>>>> the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the >>>>>> fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term >>>>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>> (infinities of) computations (measure). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Explanation is easy. Prediction is hard. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict >>>> that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of >>>> time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case. >>> >>> >>> >>> Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as "good" >>> those >>> that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the Moon is a >>> circle. >> >> >> Right, but the problem with laughing at them is that our current >> super-serious scientific theories might be the target of similar >> laughter by our descendants 1K years from now -- if we manage to >> survive that long, of course. >> >>>> >>>> A more modern set of examples: >>>> >>>> - Neural correlates are easy to find, explaining how the brain >>>> actually works is super-hard; >>>> >>>> - Epidemiological studies keep predicting all sorts of things about >>>> nutritional habits, >>> >>> >>> >>> Maybe I didn't express myself precisely enough. Prediction that is >>> accurate >> >> >> All of the examples that I gave you are of accurate predictions: the >> sun does go up every morning, drinking soda makes you fat and certain >> parts of the brain reliably become more active when you look at photos >> of nice girls (or boys, let's not be sexist -- although it looks like >> we scared off all the women from here long ago :) > > > Don't forget Samya.
Oops sorry Samya! > > > >> >>> and goes beyond the data in scope is hard. >> >> >> But what could "going beyond the data in scope" mean other then >> "explanation"? If your definition of prediction already includes >> explanation, then what you said is trivially true, but not very >> meaningful. >> >>> Just making a prediction is easy >>> - Donald Trump predicts he'll be the greatest President every day. >> >> >> He has a "genius-level IQ" tough. >> >>>> while we seem quite far from having reasonable >>>> explanations in most cases (too much complexity from metabolic >>>> pathways, epigentic interactions etc etc) >>>> >>>> This trend seems to only be more accentuated with certain machine >>>> learning models, that are increasingly good at predicting all sorts of >>>> things while remaining black boxes for explanatory purposes. >>>> >>>>> Physicalist can predict that >>>>> cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>>> Non-physicalists can make the same prediction (in the sense that you >>>> say "loss of consciousness"). >>> >>> >>> >>> OK, so what's the mystics explanation? >> >> >> I don't know, I never talked to mystics about this issue. >> >> The non-physicalists explanation is the same as yours: an inactive >> brain cannot process perceptual data. The disagreements are over other >> issues: what is consciousness, and what is closer to the bottom, >> consciousness or matter. Again, none of these issues interfere with >> the phenomenological world or with empirical scientific results. > > > Until now. Without QM, I would probably think that computationalism is > refuted, as computationalism predicts we see a trace of the "parallel > computations" when looking close enough to ourselves and that they obey a > non boolean logic. But QM came to the rescue of computationalism. Digital > Mechanism explains the QM facts, and what is weird in physics is just simply > predicted in arithmetic or computer science, when we take the 1P/3P > distinction into account, 'course, as we do in physics already. > > Bruno > > >> >>>> What's the problem? The disagreements >>>> might start when you ask questions like: does the universe exist when >>>> I'm not conscious? But that doesn't affect the phenomenological world, >>>> no problem. >>>> >>>>> Explanations in terms of infinities of computations are like physics >>>>> explaining things as "A consequence of the state of the universe and >>>>> the >>>>> laws of physics." >>>> >>>> >>>> I have read a few papers from physicists delving into social science >>>> problems, and what they say is not so different from what you state >>>> above :) >>> >>> >>> >>> And for that reason they are given little credence. >> >> >> To be fair, statistical physics has made some nice contributions to >> social science, namely the Schelling segregation model, and the >> application of Ising magnetization models to opinion dynamics and >> rumor spreading, as well as certain aspects of network theory. The >> problem is when these models are taken too seriously (ignoring that >> social realities are highly complex and that these models are just >> good for grasping one of the underlying dynamics of what is going on) >> >> Somewhat related: I am enjoying this very recent paper by Max Tegmark >> about natural language: >> http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06737v2 >> >> Telmo >> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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