On 19/07/2016 5:58 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jul 2016, at 09:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 5:28 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jul 2016, at 06:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 19/07/2016 2:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jul 2016, at 03:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:
As you say in another post, computationalism depends on the
breakdown of transitivity for personal identity: M is the same as
H; W is the same as H; but M is not the same as W. Given this,
you have all sorts of problems with the nature of personal
identity -- maybe it is not a modal concept! I will talk more
about this in reply to your other post.
Well, the machine notion of 3p-self can be defined in arithmetic,
and all correct machine knows that her 1p-self is not. Sure it is
a tricky notion, but the non transitivity is not a problem, as the
"Parfit person series" will work transitively in all cases, except
when duplication occurs, but why would that cause any problem, you
tell me. Nothing here threats the validity of the reasoning
leading to the reversal physics/arithmetic. I think you confused
non transitivity (the failing of some transitive link) with
intransitivity (the failing of all transitive link). With
self-duplication, we lost transitivity in one case, but both
surviver recover it as long as they do'nt duplicate again, and so
the old guy who stayed in Moscow remains the same young guy who
teleported at Moscow through some duplication a long time ago. You
might elaborate on your problem, as I don't see any.
I think a relation is either transitive or it is intransitive:
personal identity is a transitive relation; 'father of' is an
intransitive relation. You can't be 'half-pregnant', as it were.
I quote from Wikipedia on personal identity:
"Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity of a
person in the course of time. That is, the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which a person at one time and a person at another
time can be said to be the same person, persisting through time."
And from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/
"Personal identity is an instance of the relation of numerical
identity; investigations into the nature of the former, therefore,
must respect the formal properties that govern the latter. The
concept of identity is uniquely defined by (a) the logical laws of
congruence: if X is identical with Y, then all non-relational
properties borne by X are borne by Y, or formally "A(x,y)[(x = y)
--> (Fx = Fy)]; and (b) reflexivity: every X is identical with
itself, or formally "Ax(x = x). (Note that congruence and
reflexivity entail that identity is symmetric, "A(x,y)[(x = y) -->
(y = x)], and transitive, "A(x,y,z)[((x = y) & (y = z)) --> (x = z)]."
And later in the same article:
"Should fission be an acceptable scenario, it presents problems for
the psychological approach in particular. The fission outcomes Y1
and Y2 are both psychologically continuous with X. According to the
psychological approach, therefore, they are both identical with X.
By congruence, however, they are not identical with each other: Y1
and Y2 share many properties, but even at the very time the fission
operation is completed differ with regard to others, such as
spatio-temporal location. Consequently fission cases seem to show
that the psychological approach entails that a thing could be
identical with two non-identical things, which of course violates
the transitivity of identity."
Fission, in this case, is equivalent to the duplication protocols
under consideration in this discussion. There does not seem to be
any widely agreed resolution of the problems that the duplication
scenarios entail. Some acknowledge that these scenarios indicate
that psychological continuity is not sufficient for person
identity. "These commentators typically complement their
psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest
continuer clause. The former states that even though X would
survive as Y1 or Y2 if the other did not exist, given that the
other does exist, X ceases to exist." This might be problematic,
however, and we could avoid some problems by adding a
closest-continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that
the best candidate for survival in a duplication scenario, that is,
the duplicate which bears the most or the most important
resemblances to the original person X, is identical with X." For
instance, if the original survives the duplication, he is the
closest continuer and hence uniquely identical to the original.
And so on. As I have said, the philosophical literature on personal
identity is extensive and quite complex. The idea of transitivity
of personal identity does seem to be central, so duplication cases
are often problematic.
Parfit's analysis seems to suggest that the duplication scenarios,
since they violate transitivity, entail that the original that is
being duplicated does not survive the duplication. However, in the
duplication case with two copies, Y1 and Y2, although the original
X dies, having two survivors identical to the original is even
better that being identical to just one survivor. "Generally,
according to Parfit, psychological continuity with any reliable
cause matters in survival, and since personal identity does not
consist merely in psychological continuity with any reliable cause,
personal identity is not what matters in survival."
Whatever line one takes with respect to personal identity in
general, and in duplication cases in particular, it seems clear
that the simple psychological account of personal identity is
insufficient to survive all the difficulties. Abandoning the
transitivity of identity is difficult in general because it is
precisely that transitivity that gives us a reliable notion of the
continuity of personhood through time. The things that might seem
to violate transitivity in duplication (copies in separate
locations, etc, that is, non-psychological differences), also would
give violations of transitivity relating copies of the same person
at different times and places. We need a principled account of
exactly what leads to the violation of transitivity in one case and
not in the other. That is why I still think that the original is
the continuation if not deleted during duplication, and the
duplicate in that case is simply a new separate person -- sharing
some background and memories with the original, for sure, but
actually a different person. Identical twins can share many
memories and other characteristics without us ever thinking that
they are two copies of the same person. If the original is deleted
during duplication, then two new distinct individuals are created.
In this way, the important principles of identity, such as
congruence and transitivity, are respected in all cases.
But then computationalism is made false.
So computationalism is false. Is that a problem outside a very narrow
circle of believers?
As Diderot understood, computationalism (or the older Mechanism) is
what make rationalism possible. Non computationalism is believed by
creationist, or by those who invoke opportunistic magic to stop any
argument going against some fairy tales type of belief they would like
to keep.
This is a rather disappointing response to a relatively straightforward
attempt at philosophical analysis of some of the issues at stake. Rather
than engaging with the points that have been made you resort to a
generalized broad brush slander of those who don't immediately accept
your ideas.
Anyway, my goal was just to show that IF computationalism is correct,
then physicalism is false,
In which endeavour you have failed.
and that we can test computationalism by looking at the physics
extracted from arithmetical self-reference, and as it fits we get, for
the first time I think, an explanation of where quanta, and qualia,
comes from, based on very few assumptions (Robinson arithmetic).
I have not seen any derivation or explanation of qualia -- where does
the sense of redness, for instance, appear in your analysis. Your theory
has not extracted any serious physics from anywhere at all. The quantum
is far from anything that you have come up with.
This means that the evidences are in favor of computationalism and not
on (weak) materialism, for which there are no evidences at all.
You draw a false dichotomy: there are more possibilities than
computationalism and materialism. There is a great deal of evidence for
the success of empirical science -- more than you can show for your theory.
You have frequently asked for arguments against computationalism, and
claim that no serious criticism has ever been offered. But when some
substantive criticism of ideas that are at the heart of your argument is
presented, you do not engage, but retreat to vague generalities. This
does not inspire confidence.
Bruce
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